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This study looked into the effects of group identity and subject content on 
computer-mediated group and individual decision-making.  Drawing from traditional 
choice shift literature, it examines the concepts of choice shift and group polarization 
in an online setting.  It focused on online decision-making and examined whether 
normative influence is a factor in online opinion change.  In doing so it also looked at 
the effects of group identity as well as the effects of content on group and individual 
decision-making.  In particular, the purpose of this research was to examine (a) the 
effect of normative influence on individual and group decision-making; (b) the effect 
of consensus on individual decision-making and; (c) if the nature of the issue being 
decided had an effect on group and individual decision-making. Using multilevel 
mixed models, findings from this study indicate that the nature of the content being 
discussed affected decision-making and opinion change, with there being a significant 
difference between intellectual issues as opposed to risk and moral issues. Another 
finding is that gender interacted with identity as well as content on decision-making. 
This research also suggests that group polarization may occur differently in 
naturalistic computer-mediated group settings, contrary to what has been shown 
previously in the literature.  It suggests that previous studies have overlooked the 
temporal factor in the deindividuation process. This study increases our understanding 
of how content and gender affect group decision-making in CMC, and has advanced 
 our understanding of the impact of group identification on the decision-making 
process. Further research needs to explore other factors that affect online group 
decision-making such as temporal factors and the social and psychological processes 
that are activated when different types of content, in particular risk content is being 
discussed.  
 
 
 iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Tracy Loh was born in Singapore and educated in Singapore, England and the 
United States of America.  She received a Bachelor of Arts in Mass Communication 
and Sociology from the National University of Singapore, a Master of Science in 
Sociology from the University of Bristol, England as well a Master of Communication 
Studies from the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.  She has just 
completed her Doctor of Philosophy from Cornell University, USA.  Her research 
interests lie in breaching the boundaries between sociology and communication.  
Before entering academia, Tracy has also spent many years working in the 
fields of advertising, public relations and marketing communications.  Her experience 
lies mainly in the hospitality and food and beverage industries as well as in the music 
industry. 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I dedicate this dissertation to my family, in particular to my mum.
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
The writing of this dissertation has been a long, arduous, and at times painful 
journey.  But it has also been a fulfilling and rewarding one in many ways. And it 
would not have been possible had I to go at it alone.  So here is the time and place to 
put on record my gratitude for all the help rendered. Much gratitude and appreciation 
to: 
Clifford Scherer, my dissertation chair, without whose help this project would 
never have been brought to fruition.  Thank you Cliff, for your support and guidance, 
and I’m especially grateful for your patience with me :-). You have been a wonderful 
advisor and mentor, giving me the necessary space to maneuver but also pushing 
(shoving?) me when I needed it.  
Joseph Walther, Katherine McComas and Stephen Hilgartner, my committee 
members.  You have all been extremely encouraging especially when things were 
difficult.  Thank you for believing in me. 
My family, who have been behind me every step of the way.  Your 
understanding and love are very much appreciated and I am indebted to you in many 
ways. 
CLOWNS, especially the comrades – irresistible, principessa, conejo, crunchy 
and of course dmm.  I will never forget our regular Chappies Night, the parties that we 
have had and all the arguments, whining and complaining that goes with grad school.  
You have made Ithaca bearable and even enjoyable for me. Until the next revolution 
… 
Claudia, my child, my cohort-mate, my dearest friend, whose friendship and 
support I have come to treasure and rely on.  Thanks for sharing this journey with me, 
 vi 
along with its delights and frustrations. I couldn’t have made it without you.  I will 
miss you dearly. 
Emily, Connie and Naomi, my Asian amigos who have brought me much 
laughter and encouragement and yummy food. We will travel the world together.  
Long live the mochi! Not forgetting Meredith who has had to endure living with me 
for 2 years and hearing me gripe and moan and gripe and moan more.  I still remember 
our late night teas, the sushi and fish on the plate, and the pancake breakfasts.  I 
believe, I believe, I believe .. and I hope you will always do so too. 
Frank Shotkoski, who has kept me sane and alive in more ways than one.  You 
kept pushing me even when I have resented you for doing so.   
Last, but more importantly I’d like to thank the Lord, for all I have today is due 
to his amazing grace and mercy.  I have been and am still very blessed.  Deo Gratias.
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH iii 
DEDICATION iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS vii 
LIST OF FIGURES x 
LIST OF TABLES xi 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 1 
Significance of this research 5 
CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 11 
Choice Shift Theories 11 
Social comparison processes. 13 
Persuasive argument hypothesis. 16 
The Effect of Computer-Mediated Communication 17 
The influence of group norms. 20 
Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) 22 
Deindividuation and group polarization 26 
Risk Perception 32 
Affect. 34 
CHAPTER 3 - METHODS 39 
Research Design 39 
Participants. 40 
 viii 
Procedure 40 
Manipulation of Identity 42 
The Choice Dilemmas 44 
Variables/Measures 45 
CHAPTER 4 - FINDINGS 47 
Manipulation Check for Identity 47 
Hypothesis Testing 48 
Effect of Normative Influence on Decision-Making 50 
Effect of Consensus 55 
Effect of Content/Issue Type 57 
CHAPTER 5 - FURTHER ANALYSIS 63 
Individual Scenarios 63 
Outliers 69 
Drunk Driving 71 
Infidelity A 74 
Infidelity B 82 
Infidelity B 86 
Game of Chance A 90 
Game of Chance B 94 
Game of Chance B 96 
CHAPTER 6 - DISCUSSION 99 
How is This Study Different? 99 
Effect of Normative Influence on Decision-Making 101 
Effect of Consensus on Decision-Making 104 
 ix 
Effect of Story Content/Issue Type 105 
Effect of Individual Scenarios 107 
Implications and Future Research 109 
APPENDIX 1 - CHOICE DILEMMA QUESTIONNAIRE 113 
APPENDIX 2 - MANIPULATION OF DEINIDIVIDUATED GROUPS 121 
APPENDIX 3 - MANIPULATION OF INDIVIDUATED GROUPS 122 
APPENDIX 4 - MEASURES 123 
REFERENCES 125 
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Research Design  39 
Figure 2. Transcript of the beginning of a session for an individuated group.    43 
Figure 3. Transcript of the beginning of a session for a deindividuated group.    43 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. - Variables in Study 45 
Table 2. - Effect of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity 51 
Table 3. - Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on  
Norm Conformity  52 
Table 4. - Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization 53 
Table 5. - Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on  
Group Polarization 53 
Table 6. - Effect of Individuating Information on Choice Shift 54 
Table 7. - Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on Choice Shift 55 
Table 8. - Effect of Deliberation on Group Polarization 56 
Table 9. - Details of the Effects of Deliberation on Group Polarization 56 
Table 10. - Effect of Content on Choice Shift 58 
Table 11. - Details of the Interaction Between Gender,   
Content and Choice Shift  59 
Table 12. - Effect of Content on Group Polarization 60 
Table 13. - Details of the Effects of Story Content on Group Polarization 61 
Table 14. - Effect of Story Content on Norm Conformity 61 
Table 15. - Details of the Effects of Story Content on Norm Conformity 62 
Table 16. - Summary of Issues and Scenarios Used 64 
Table 17. - Summary of Significant Effects 68 
Table 18. - Summary of Significant Effects for Outliers 70 
Table 19. - Effect of Individuating Information on Norm  
Conformity (Drunk Driving) 71 
Table 20. - Details of the Effects of Gender and Individuating Information  
 xii 
on Norm Conformity (Drunk Driving) 72 
Table 21. - Cross Tabulation Between Gender and Norm  
Conformity for Drunk Driving 73 
Table 22. - Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization  
(Infidelity A) 74 
Table 23. - Interaction Between Gender and Individuating Information on Group 
Polarization (Infidelity A) 75 
Table 24. - Cross Tabulation Between Group Polarization (Infidelity A) and 
Individuating Information for Males 76 
Table 25. - Cross Tabulation Between Group Polarization (Infidelity A) and 
Individuating Information for Females 77 
Table 26. - Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization  
(Infidelity A) - Outliers 78 
Table 27. - Interaction Between Gender and Individuating Information on  
Group Polarization (Infidelity A) - Outliers 79 
Table 28. - Cross tabulation between Group Polarization (Infidelity A) and  
Gender – Outliers 80 
Table 29. - Cross tabulation between Group Polarization (Infidelity A) and  
Identity in Females – Outliers 81 
Table 30. - Effect of Individuating Information on Choice Shift (Infidelity B) 82 
Table 31. - Details of the Effects of Gender on Choice Shift (Infidelity B) 83 
Table 32. - Cross Tabulation Between Choice Shift (Infidelity B) and Gender 84 
Table 33. - Effect of Individuating Information on Choice Shift  
(Infidelity B) - Outliers 85 
Table 34. - Details of the Effects of Gender on Choice Shift (Infidelity B)  
- Outliers 85 
 xiii 
Table 35. - Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization  
(Infidelity B) 86 
Table 36. - Details of the Effects of Gender on Choice Shift  
(Infidelity B) - Outliers 87 
Table 37. - Cross Tabulation Between Group Polarization (Infidelity B)  
and Gender 88 
Table 38. - Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization  
(Infidelity B) - Outliers 89 
Table 39. - Details of the Effects of Gender on Group Polarization  
(Infidelity B) - Outliers 89 
Table 40. - Effect of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity  
(Game of Chance A) 90 
Table 41. - Details of the Effects of Gender on Norm Conformity  
(Game of Chance A) 91 
Table 42. - Effect of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity (Game of 
Chance A) - Outliers 91 
Table 43. - Details of the Effects of Gender on Norm Conformity  
(Game of Chance A) - Outliers 92 
Table 44. - Effect of Individuating Information on Choice Shift  
(Game of Chance A) - Outliers 93 
Table 45. - Details of the Effects of Gender on Choice Shift (Game of Chance A) 93 
Table 46. -Effect of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity  
(Game of Chance B) 94 
Table 47. - Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on  
Norm Conformity (Game of Chance B) 94 
Table 48. - Effect of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity  
 xiv 
(Game of Chance B) - Outliers 95 
Table 49. - Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on  
Norm Conformity (Game of Chance B) - Outliers 96 
Table 50. - Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization  
(Game of Chance B) 96 
Table 51. - Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on  
Group Polarization (Game of Chance B) 97 
Table 52. - Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization  
(Game of Chance B) 97 
Table 53. - Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on Group Polarization 
(Game of Chance B) - Outliers 98 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The genesis for this research emerged due to a fascination with the way that 
people communicate online, in particular the communication that occurs within the 
proliferation of online bulletin boards and social support groups and how it affects the 
decisions that people make. Hence, this study looked into the effects of computer-
mediated communication (CMC) on group and individual decision-making.  Of 
particular interest is the making of decisions where the content under discussion has an 
element of risk attached to it, as well as the impact of normative influence and group 
identification on the decision-making process. 
The plethora of information available online and the convenience of being able 
to conduct research in the comfort of one’s own home has led many people to turn to 
the Internet as a primary source of information or to supplement existing information 
sources. According to a survey conducted by the Pew Internet and American Life 
Research, the two most popular uses of the Internet are for obtaining information and 
for communicating with others. In December 2007, 75% of Americans used the 
Internet, out of which 92% used it to read or send email and 91% used it to search for 
information (Pew Internet Project, 2007). 
Of particular interest is the change in the way that people obtain health and 
medical related information. Health searches are now as popular an online activity as 
paying bills online or reading blogs. In an August 2006 survey, 80% of Internet users 
or some 113 million Americans said that they had gone online to search for health or 
medical information (Fox, August 2006).  On a typical day, 7% of health seekers, or 
about 8 million Americans search for information on at least one health topic. The 
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information found online has affected the decisions that people make towards the 
treatment of their illnesses.  Fifty-eight percent said the information they found in their 
last search affected a decision about how to treat an illness or condition, 55% said the 
information changed their overall approach to maintaining their health or the health of 
someone they help take care of, 54% said the information led them to ask a doctor new 
questions or to get a second opinion from another doctor. Thirty-nine percent said the 
information changed the way they cope with a chronic condition or manage pain and 
35% said the information affected a decision about whether to see a doctor (Fox, 
2006).  
Unfortunately amidst the cornucopia of information, very few people bother to 
check on the veracity of what they find online.  Just 15% of health seekers said that 
they “always” checked the source and date of the online health information that they 
found, while another 10% said they did so “most of the time.” Fully three-quarters of 
health seekers said they checked the source and date “only sometimes,” “hardly ever,” 
or “never”.  This means that about 85 million Americans are gathering health advice 
online without consistently examining the quality indicators of the information that 
they find (Fox, 2006) . 
Websites are not the only places online where individuals can go in search of 
information. Countless discussion lists and bulletin boards have sprung up where 
individuals can share their knowledge, exchange information, as well as seek and give 
social support. In 2001, 90 million Americans used the Internet to make some sort of 
contact with some type of online groups e.g. trade/professional groups, hobby/interest 
groups, community groups, support groups) and on average, each user made contact 
with four different online groups (Horrigan, Rainee, & Fox, 2001).  In 2002, taking 
part in an online group was a daily activity for approximately 4.1 million Americans 
(Pew Internet Project, 2004).  
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Thus, not only are people going online to find information, they are also going 
online to seek out like-minded others, to bond with and to share similar experiences 
with others.   Research has shown that these online communities are vibrant and as 
real psychologically to their participants as their offline counterparts, even though the 
participants of these online communities are geographically dispersed and might have 
never met each other in real life. The amount of attachment and attraction that the 
participants feel towards these groups are similar to their traditional offline 
counterparts. Braithwaite, Waldron, and Finn (1999) have found that online support 
groups featured all the categories of traditional social support groups, such as 
information, esteem, network, and emotional support, with participants sharing highly 
personal stories.  
The assistance and support rendered online can be unstinting and generous, as 
can be the empathy.  Many of these social support groups are focused around health 
issues and offer both practical and emotional advice and support. These support 
groups can take the form of informally organized peer discussion groups which mainly 
consist of patients, prospective patients, former patients, or relatives of patients 
(Preece & Ghozati, 2000; Walther & Boyd, 2002).  At times, the advice given by these 
online support groups might often appear to be more relevant and germane to a patient 
than those given by the medical establishment. Due to the influence of homophily, 
which is the perception of similarity between individuals, online support groups might 
impact the way that individuals perceive the information that they receive in a 
different manner than would information received from another source, such as from 
an expert (Walther, Wang, & Loh, 2004).   
One reason might be because of the existence of embedded knowledge.  As 
opposed to medical professionals who have credentialed expertise, participants on 
these forums and lists have embodied knowledge, that is, their knowledge is a result of 
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a direct experience with the disease, treatments or social situations. They are also 
familiar with the various formal and informal sources of information (Walther et al., 
2004). These numerous support groups and chat groups have put people in contact 
with a variety of sources of information that they would not have had access to a 
decade or more ago.   
Rodgers and Chen (2005) have found that discussion boards not only drew 
individuals from diverse demographic backgrounds, but also brought together 
individuals from diverse geographic locales. In addition, online communities seem not 
only rich in storing medical information and knowledge about various illnesses and 
disease but also possessed an intimate knowledge regarding the diseases, such as 
emotional responses and coping strategies. In their study on the effects of participation 
in a breast cancer discussion board, they found that participants in online discussion 
boards gained many other psychosocial functions—such as social support, increased 
skill or ability to cope with the disease, improved mood, decreased psychological 
distress, and strategies to manage stress—apart from just the informational ones.   
Similarly, Preece and Ghozati (2000) have found that women used the Internet and 
online communities for both emotional support and factual information. 
There is however, a dark side to the plethora of help offered.  At times, the 
online postings and suggestions disdain modern medicine in favor of alternative 
remedies such as folk or traditional medicine in the treatment of ailments. Individuals 
might decide to supplement conventional medical treatment with alternative medical 
treatments, which might be detrimental to their health or eschew conventional 
treatments for these alternative treatments. They may decide to subvert the medical 
advice given by doctors and other medical professionals and follow alternative 
approaches, which are deemed dangerous by medical professionals. These alternative 
treatments run the risk of having a potential harmful interaction with modern medicine 
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and in those cases where alternative treatment is adopted in lieu of modern medicine, 
the consequences might be fatal.  It might also lead more people to choose to self -
diagnose and self-medicate using a combination of the medical information found 
online to self-diagnose and then choosing to self-medicate using the online pharmacies 
(Fox, Ward, & O'Rourke, 2005).   
These speculations have been partially borne out by Rodgers and Chen’s 
(2005) analysis.  Their study revealed that information about treatments and 
medications (anti-depressants and anti-nausea medications) are exchanged fairly 
extensively, and they have come across a number of cases where the women on the 
discussion boards used the information learned from other members of the group to 
inform their own decisions about treatment, medications and so on.  For health 
practitioners, this could be posed as a challenge as their authority and expertise will 
constantly be cross-validated by the community members online. Rodgers and Chen 
commented that physicians might have to therefore spend time on these online 
communities in order to provide “expert” testimony and to debunk myths about 
potential treatments that may help speed up recovery.  On the flip side, these 
communities might also provide a good opportunity for health practitioners to learn 
about the psychosocial needs of their patients. 
 
Significance of this research 
Given the pervasive influence that the Internet has on our every day lives, this 
online interaction as well as the advice obtained might have an effect on people’s 
decision-making. The example given above is just one example of the myriad ways 
that the Internet has changed the ways that people within groups relate to one another 
and to the group, as well as the way that they gather information.  It is therefore of 
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interest and importance to examine the decision-making process of individuals who 
engage in online discussions. A lot of the group decisions that were once made face to 
face (FTF) are now moving online and it is of growing importance to examine how 
CMC might affect the decision-making process.  
A well-documented position in the social science literature is that people 
making decisions in groups have a tendency to make riskier decisions than when they 
make the same decision as individuals.  When people are deliberating with like-
minded others, there is a tendency for views to become reinforced and under some 
circumstances, this may result in the development of extreme views.  This movement 
or tendency of a shift towards more extreme views is not bad in and of itself, but may 
have a detrimental effect in a number of conditions.  For example when radical views 
on race, politics or sexual orientation such as those espoused by hate groups are 
reinforced and promulgated, or as seen in the earlier example, when alternative 
medical treatments are advocated in lieu of modern medication. 
The ways that CMC and group decision-making work online can have 
implications not only on the personal level as mentioned above but also on the 
organization as well on the societal level.  In today’s global world where business 
deals cut across geographic and national boundaries, many organizations nowadays 
need to utilize computer-supported collaboration tools to work not only within the 
organization itself but also with business associates across the globe.  The benefits that 
these organizations reap as well as the costs that they might incur from the use of 
CMC and online collaboration is highly dependent on the group’s composition as well 
as the group’s goals. 
There are critical and crucial differences between computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) and face-to-face communication (FTF), with the main 
characteristics of online communication being visual anonymity and reduction of 
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social cues.  These factors work together to make CMC different from FTF in various 
ways. For example, CMC can affect feelings of belongingness to the group as well as 
a sense of group identity in the minds of its members. As such, this might affect the 
amount of conformity to the group norms.   
CMC can be used to decrease the effects of having a geographically dispersed 
team. These teams might use CMC to augment the exchange of personal information 
among the geographically dispersed group members. Research has shown that 
dispersed teams tend to develop subgroup identities based on location and that these 
subgroup identities function as in-groups and out-groups, causing biased attributions 
against out-groups (Cramton, 2002).  If so, sharing more personal information about 
remote team members might reduce subgroup tensions by discouraging group-based 
perceptions.  This might be especially beneficial for newly formed teams where the 
members do not know each other and there are few shared goals or group boundaries.  
On the other hand, groups with well-defined boundary and shared goals might want to 
promote group-based thinking by allowing the anonymity of online communication to 
foster sub-group identification with fellow group members. Organizations might 
benefit instead from group polarization due to innovation and entrepreneurship via the 
encouragement of risk-taking behavior (Lee, 2007). 
On a societal level, the Internet has also been known to have a mobilization 
potential.  Studies have shown that individuals and groups have utilized the Internet to 
push forth social action and the Internet has served to unite people globally. The use of 
information technologies has dramatically influenced the non-governmental sector and 
civil society. It has led to changes and dispersion of membership across space and time 
(Shumate & Pike, 2006), changes in the media’s coverage of an event, especially with 
the rise of citizen journalism (Downing, 2001) as well as changes in the way that 
protests are organized (Scott & Street, 2000).   
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Increasingly, information technologies are providing new ways for 
organizations to cooperate with one another (Shumate & Dewitt, 2008).  CMC has 
enabled a greater audience to be reached, and thus potentially increases the number of 
people who can be mobilized.  By posting information about their cause online, as 
well as by joining or hosting discussion boards and mailing lists, activists can enlarge 
their circle of supporters and increase their critical mass. The use of email lists and 
bulletin boards also helps organizations to reach out to those already sympathetic to 
the movement, or within similar networks. This would also enable them to reach out 
globally and to join forces as well as exchange resources with similar groups and like-
minded others internationally. For example, Friends of the Environment has been able 
to encourage online activism and new members to join their cause via its website, 
while Lyminge, another environmental group has succeeded in raising its profile and 
campaign to save the Westwood Forest, attracted new visitors and established 
international links via CMC (Pickerill, 2001).   
Hence it is now common to find interest groups with members from all over 
the world corresponding with each other. Individuals can come together online to 
discuss the newest drug trial, to organize an international protest or vigil, or to discuss 
whether or not to a nuclear power plant should be built near a particular town or in a 
particular area.   Similar to online social support groups, these special interest groups 
are often made up of many anonymous geographically dispersed individuals who 
might never meet in offline. In chat rooms and discussion groups on controversial 
topics, people tend to remain anonymous with little, if any personal information 
revealed. Also as participants get exposed to the arguments supporting both sides, 
anonymity might highlight the contrast between those who are in agreement with us, 
effectively forming an in-group as opposed to those who hold differing view, i.e. the 
out-group.  There is therefore the formation of an “us versus them” distinction.  Under 
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these circumstances, the individual might become more likely to polarize their 
opinions, both to proclaim their issue standing more clearly to the in-group members 
and to distance themselves further from the out-group.  In such cases, online 
discussions might amplify the division between social groups holding different views, 
rather than serve as a tool for building public consensus through the exchange of 
reasoned discourse (Lee, 2007). It would therefore appear that in the CMC settings of 
bulletin boards and chat rooms, if the group identity is strong, communication online 
might lead to greater group identification and conformity to the group norms.   Hence 
it is a possibility that when groups make their decisions via CMC as opposed to being 
in a FTF environment, this would result in the heightening of social norms which 
might have important repercussions on group dynamics, particularly on a group’s 
tendency to make more extreme group decisions. 
As stated before, websites, bulletin boards and chat rooms have the potential to 
bring together diverse peoples and influence views and opinions.  Therefore, the 
Internet and CMC might also affect the ways that people think about and perceive the 
risks encountered.  This would also in turn affect the way that various risks are treated 
in society.  To date, most of the current work looks at the decision-making process as 
a rational process, but research from the risk literature tells us that people perceive and 
react to risk in a very different way than they do to other issues.   Risk perception is 
inherently subjective (Slovic, 1987).  The layperson and the expert view risk very 
differently.  For the layperson, if there risk pertains to something that is important or if 
the risk is unknown or dreaded, rationality takes a backseat when it comes to one’s 
ability to tolerate the amount of risk (Slovic, 1992).  
As such, when it comes to decision-making concerning risk, there is the greater 
use of the affect heuristic when making judgments.  This form of decision-making 
appears to utilize a different process that that of rational decision-making.  Research 
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therefore needs to be conducted to look at the effect of risky issues on decision-
making, in particular, the effect of risky issues on decision-making in a computer-
meditated environment.  It would therefore be important and interesting to find out if 
the content or type of the issue under consideration would make a difference to the 
decision-making process and if it does, what sort of differences would it make.  
This study therefore sets out to examine the effects of group identity and issue 
content on online decision-making.  The next chapter examines the relevant literature 
and puts forth the research questions and hypotheses that drive this study.  Chapter 3 
lays out the methodology while the data is analyzed in relation to the hypotheses in 
chapter 4.  Chapter 5 contains the further analysis, which looks at other interesting 
findings in the data, and the dissertation concludes with a short discussion in chapter 6 
that relates the data back to the current literature. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This study looks at how being in a group affects individual and group decision-
making. In light of the extant literature, it is important to understand how people 
behave in groups online.  Of particular interest is the question of how people make 
decisions as a result of being in an online group or participating in an online group 
discussion, as well as the effect of content on online group and individual decision-
making. This chapter begins with an overview of the relevant literature on choice 
shifts, computer-mediated communication and risk perception and proceeds to set out 
the research questions and hypotheses that guide this study. 
 
Choice Shift Theories  
Groups have a tendency to make more extreme decisions than what its 
individual members would have made and individuals may agree to more extreme 
positions after having been in a group discussion than they would have agreed to a 
priori (Levine & Moreland, 1998). In such situations, the initial tendencies of the 
individual members of the group towards a given direction are enhanced. This 
phenomenon is known as choice shift and is an extension of the frequently 
documented risky shift phenomenon, that is, the tendency for groups to make more 
risky decisions than what its individual members would have made. Cautious shifts do 
occur as well, albeit less frequently and are often of a lesser magnitude than risky 
shifts (Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990; Isenberg, 1986; Mackie, 1986; Moscovici & 
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Zavalloni, 1969). The term choice shift refers to the difference between the arithmetic 
mean of the individual’s pre-discussion preferences and the group decision.  
A closely related phenomenon to choice shift is that of group polarization, 
which is defined as the movement of individual opinions, following group discussion, 
toward and beyond the initial group mean (Myers & Lamm, 1976).  It denotes the 
differences between the pre-discussion preferences and the individual first preferences 
after the group discussion i.e. the post-discussion preferences (Hinsz & Davis, 1984; 
Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan & Miller, 1983). In group polarization, mean post-discussion 
responses to an issue reflect the adoption of attitudes that are more extreme than, but 
in the same direction as, the group's mean pre-discussion position.  
Choice shift and group polarization need not, however, be of equal magnitude. 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the shift that occurs at the group level 
(choice shift) and that which occurs at the individual level (group polarization). 
Contrary to many contemporary treatments, these two levels should not be considered 
equivalent (Zuber, Crott, & Werner, 1992). 
To measure choice shift and group polarization, the first researchers employed 
the use of a set of decision problems.  When they compared the level of risk displayed 
by groups after discussion of these problems to the individual level of riskiness 
displayed by the members prior to the discussions, they found that groups would make 
more risky decisions than individuals, taking the problem set as a whole.  This was 
termed the “risky shift” (Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1962).  However, other scholars 
found that groups usually shift in the direction of caution on two of the problems in 
the original set1 (Brown, 1965). Other researchers have also been able to write 
additional items that cause the group to shift towards caution (Fraser, Gouge, & Billig, 
                                                
1  One problem involves the chances of success in building of a new plant abroad and the other deals 
with the chances of success in a marriage. 
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1970; Rabow, Fowler, Bradford, Hofeller, & Shibuya, 1966; Stoner, 1968). Hence, the 
term “choice shift” was considered to be a more proper term for this phenomenon, as 
opposed to the original term of “risky shift” (Pruitt, 1971).  
Although effect of choice shift and group polarization have been widely 
documented, there has been some debate as to the underlying processes that account 
for this shift. Some social psychological explanations have suggested that social 
comparison is responsible for the shifts (Brown, 1965), whereby group members 
compare themselves with each other in an attempt to occupy the socially valued 
extreme positions in the group, and that extremity is a socially valued position in its 
own right.  Others have proposed that the change occurred as a function of the 
arguments exchanged, and that information influence is its source (Burnstein & 
Vinokur, 1977).  Reviews have concluded that both types of influence are to some 
extent involved (Isenberg, 1986), and that the predominance of each mode of social 
influence is determined by contextual factors such as the type of issue under 
discussion (Kaplan & Miller, 1987).  Research into choice shift and group polarization 
has spawned hundreds of studies in the 1970s and researchers finally came to the 
consensus that out of all the myriad explanations for this phenomenon, the evidence 
that came out of this showed that two major processes were at work: social 
comparison processes and persuasive argumentation.   For that reason, the rest of this 
section will concentrate on these two explanations. 
Social comparison processes. 
The social comparison hypothesis is based on the importance of the prevailing 
cultural values and predicts that any action that allows one to discover either implicitly 
or explicitly others’ positions on an issue leads to a choice shift, with the direction of 
the shift dependent upon the way that others respond (Mayer, 1985).  So long as there 
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is a way for group members to make comparisons, this would result in a choice shift. 
Thus an exchange of decisions would be sufficient to produce the choice shift, as 
would a discussion. 
Brown (1965) developed one version of the theory known as “risk-as-value” 
social comparison theory.  Brown postulated that riskiness is a culturally prescribed 
value or ego ideal, which causes the typical American to want to be at least as risky in 
his behavior as other people similar to him.  This implies a social comparison process 
in which the individual tries to figure out where other people stand on the decision 
problem that he is facing, and then, chooses, as his initial decision, a level of risk that 
is at or above what he assumes to be the group average.  The theory also explains 
cautious shifts in terms of a value on caution which impels people in some problems to 
be equally or more cautious than the group average. Currently, support for this theory 
is mixed at best. 
Jellison and Riskind (1970) came up with another version of the theory, the 
social comparison of abilities theory.  They tested the hypothesis that people would 
attribute greater riskiness to another as a direct function of the other’s ability, and 
hence the risk level taken by a person would be interpreted as an index of his ability. 
They postulated that people see risk taking as a sign of ability and hence the more risk 
that the individual undertakes, the greater the ability possessed. Hence, people who are 
motivated to demonstrate their ability would take higher risks than people who are not 
so motivated.  People also tend to view themselves as more capable and as having a 
greater likelihood of success than others.  This is derived from Festinger’s (1954) 
theory that people wish to see themselves as having slightly more ability than others 
with whom they compare themselves against.  Combining the above with the view of 
risk as ability, thus when a person learns that the level of risk that he has taken is 
below the group average, he infers that his ability is less than that of other group 
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members. This leads him to raise his level of risk, thus producing the risky shift.  
Studies have supported the hypothesis and the idea that ability and risk taking are 
perceived as closely related.  Participants expected their peers to take lower risks than 
themselves and that the most admired risk preferences were higher than their own 
(Jellison & Riskind, 1970).  Clark, Crockett and Archer (1971)  too found support for 
the risk-as-value hypothesis.  In their study, a greater risky shift was found among 
those subjects who perceived themselves to be at least more willing as their peers to 
take risk.   
Another explanation, is that of pluralistic ignorance which assumes that 
decision-making in many areas is guided by a “conflict-compromise” process 
(Levinger & Schneider, 1969). The conflict is between an ideal preference, which is 
what the individual would really like to do and an assumed group standard, which is 
what the individual thinks other people favor. Such a conflict leads to a choice of a 
compromise position that falls part way between the individual’s ideal and the 
assumed group standard. In a group discussion, if it is shown that other members of 
the groups favor a position that is closer to the individual’s ideal, the individual will 
shift his own position towards his ideal, thereby demonstrating a choice shift. This 
shift can be towards risk or caution. What is important is that individuals do not 
realize at first how widely their values are shared.  Under such circumstances, 
discussion brings to light that there was greater social support for risk taking or 
caution than what was anticipated and this allows the individual to shift his position 
accordingly. In general, people tend to assume that the group standard as relatively 
more cautious, and believed themselves to be riskier than their peers.  In addition, it 
has been found that people perceive their ideals as riskier than themselves, indicating 
that risk taking is a valued trait.  
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In summary, social comparison and pluralistic ignorance both take the view 
that individual group members respond to what they perceive to be the average level 
of risk taking among the other group members.  Social comparison theory holds that 
the individual will try to be at or above this average while pluralistic ignorance holds 
that the group experience causes the individual to rethink his assumptions about group 
standards and act accordingly.   
Persuasive argument hypothesis. 
The persuasive argument hypothesis is based upon the idea that the provision 
of additional information or novel arguments could change or sway an individual’s 
decision. An individual’s choice is dependent on the number of arguments presented 
as well as the persuasiveness of the arguments for and against a certain decision that 
the individual recalls when formulating his position.   Choice shifts are seen as the 
result of the advancement of novel arguments and should occur in the direction of the 
preponderance of the arguments used in a discussion (Silverthorne, 1971).  Ebbeson 
and Bowers (1974)  found that the proportion of arguments expressed for a position 
correlates highly with the direction of the shift. Vinokur and Burnstein (1974) found 
that the pool of arguments and the number of arguments generated by the individuals 
and groups were in the direction of the choice shift. They also reported that individuals 
perceive arguments favoring the direction of the eventual choice shift to be more 
persuasive than arguments in the opposite direction. Vinokur and Burnstein (1974a) 
also reported that novel arguments tend to be more persuasive than familiar 
arguments.  Exposure to others’ discussions produces shifts in the direction of the 
arguments advanced in the discussion (Clark & Crockett, 1971; Kogan & Wallach, 
1967a; Lamm, 1967). Clark and Crockett (1971) found that persons biased towards 
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either risk or caution changed in the direction advocated by discussants who opposed 
their initial positions.  
Thus far, a review of the literature has found mixed support for both 
explanations of choice shift. Mayer (1985) in comparing several reasons of choice 
shift found most support for the persuasive argument hypothesis, followed by minimal 
support for the social comparison hypothesis. Isenberg (1986) in his meta-review of 
the group polarization literature suggested that social comparison and persuasive 
argumentation occur in combination to produce polarization, although persuasive 
argumentation effects tend to be larger. However, as research into choice shift was 
mainly conducted in the 1970s before the advent of the Internet, there have been very 
few studies conducted that has looked into the effects of this new medium on the 
choice shift phenomenon.   The next section reviews the literature on CMC and how it 
might have an impact on this phenomenon. 
 
The Effect of Computer-Mediated Communication 
Extant research has examined choice shifts and group polarization in the realm 
of decision-making within small groups.  There have been relatively fewer studies as 
yet that look at the effects of CMC on choice shifts in group decision-making. CMC 
lacks the social cues of FTF communication, and this has implications on the way that 
individuals perceive of themselves in relation to a group, which in turn has 
implications on the making of judgments and decisions.  As such, the Internet and 
CMC may affect risk perception and risk judgments by means of the way that 
communication occurs online. 
Studies that have looked at group polarization online has found that the 
medium has an effect on group polarization with there being greater polarization in 
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online groups as compared to FTF groups (Adrianson & Hjelmquist, 1999; Hiltz, 
Turoff, & Johnson, 1989; Kiesler, Siegel, & McGuire, 1984; Siegal, Dubrovsky, 
Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986; Sproull & Kiesler, 1991). Siegel et al. explained their 
results in terms of a lack of social norms and a lowered consciousness about the 
“others” while Adrianson and Hjelmquist suggested that reduced conformity and 
opinion changes in CMC were due to the effects of written communication, i.e. the 
lack of feedback and loss of nonverbal signals.  These explanations were part of the 
reduced social cues approach to CMC in which most theories predicted that compared 
to FTF interaction, normative social influence will be reduced in CMC due to the 
absence of nonverbal cues. The absence of social and contextual cues in CMC 
encourages psychological states that undermine the social and normative influences of 
individuals or groups, leading to more deregulated and extreme (i.e. anti-normative) 
behaviors (Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & Sethna, 1991; McLeod, Baron, Marti, & Yoon, 
1997; Sproull & Kiesler, 1991; Valacich, Jessup, Dennis, & Nunamaker, 1992). 
This explanation appears to sit well with the ‘persuasive argument theory’ 
proposed by Burstein and Vinokur (1977) in which group polarization and choice shift 
can be seen as a function of the number of persuasive (i.e. novel) arguments favoring 
that already preferred pole to which one is exposed to during group discussions.  It is 
argued that both the uninhibited behavior and the more equal participation 
characteristic of CMC facilitate the exchange of more persuasive arguments favoring 
the preferred pole.  Removing social cues removes those social inhibitions or 
normative constraints that could act as a brake on the generation or articulation of 
extreme arguments, particularly by reducing or removing indicators of power, prestige 
or social status. The absence of social cues also leads to more equal participation of 
group members putatively facilitating the greater exchange of extreme arguments 
(Kiesler et al., 1984; Siegal et al., 1986; Sproull & Kiesler, 1991). 
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Sproull & Kiesler (1991) found that as a result of increased democracy, CMC 
users gave more proposals for action compared to members of FTF groups. Miranda 
(1994) found that there was less likelihood for groupthink to occur during computer-
mediated discussions as more alternatives were put forward by the group. Anonymity 
was found to attenuate majority pressure in a group decision-making situation and 
when groups in an identifiable CMC condition were compared to those in the 
anonymous CMC condition, those in the anonymous condition contributed 
significantly more critical and solution-questioning comments (Jessup, Connolly, & 
Galegher, 1990).  Sia, Tan and Wei (2002) manipulated the presence of verbal and 
visual cues to reduce social presence, and found that the removal of verbal cues did 
not reduce social presence sufficiently to impact group polarization but removal of 
visual cues resulted in greater group polarization.  In another experiment, anonymity 
was manipulated and it was found that anonymity reduced social presence and thus 
increased group polarization. Sia et al. explained their results by way of the social 
presence argument in that decrease in social presence might have led to more 
uninhibited behavior which in turn led to increased one–upmanship and increased 
novel argument generation. 
McGuire, Kiesler and Siegel’s (1987) study saw that the CMC groups showed 
less of a choice shift than FTF groups did and they took this as support for the 
persuasive argument as the CMC groups contained fewer arguments than the FTF 
groups. However, the study employed a design in which both CMC and FTF groups 
were given the same amount of time to come to their decisions and current research 
has shown that it takes about 5 times longer to conduct a conversation via CMC than 
FTF (Walther & Parks, 2002). Hence it is most probable that should the CMC groups 
be given more time to conduct their discussion, the results would have been very 
different. 
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On the negative side, Kraemer & Pinsonneault (1990) found that compared to 
FTF groups, CMC groups found it more difficult to arrive at a consensus, taking a 
longer time and reporting lower satisfaction with the consensus. These findings have 
implications for health and risk in that greater disinhibition online might result in the 
advocacy and adoption of unconventional treatment methods on online social support 
groups and discussion boards.  They could also result in skewed risk perception 
Kiesler (1986) noted that disinhibition could also be a factor for the social 
comparison explanation for choice shifts and group polarization.   Social comparison 
theory (Sanders & Baron, 1977) posits that changes results from conformity to a 
socially desirable but extreme norm that becomes publicly revealed only during group 
discussions.  Thus this disinhibition associated with reduced social cues and 
anonymity presumably helps reveal more of this hidden norm, or pushes it further to 
the extreme.   
The influence of group norms. 
Recent studies appear to indicate that arguments for informational influence 
and persuasive arguments might be inadequate. Persuasive argumentation cannot 
account for the fact that according to Postmes, Haslam and Swaab (2005), during 
inter-group debates there is often evidence of bipolarization, i.e. the two groups were 
distancing themselves from each other attitudinally, even when arguments are shared 
among members of both groups (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2002).  It is interesting to 
note that in some of studies, the magnitude of polarization varied considerably across 
conditions even when the content of the discussions was the same in all of them. For 
each of these findings, simple informational influence is an implausible explanation of 
such polarization.  If members of two groups access the same information, 
bipolarization should not occur.   
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Similarly there is no reason why anonymity would enhance informational 
influence. If arguments are held constant, polarization should be of a similar 
magnitude.   In fact, in certain contexts where there was increased group polarization, 
recall of the persuasive arguments was poorer (Postmes et al., 2002).  This indicates 
that there are other factors coming into play that account for the polarization 
phenomenon besides that of persuasive arguments and that polarization is not due to 
attention to specific arguments and their novelty.  
Thus, there appears to some other process at work rather than just social 
comparison and persuasive arguments.  It is plausible that social comparison might be 
occurring whereby pluralistic ignorance is decreased.  However, it is unlikely that 
polarization occurs due to the desire to be seen as extreme within the group. The 
Internet’s unique characteristics of anonymity and deindividuation would dilute the 
impact of self-presentation as it serves less purpose to the individual.  
Due to the nature of CMC, there might be another explanation for online group 
polarization—that of the influence of group norms. Members of the group are 
influenced by the group norm to make more extreme decisions. In CMC, under 
deindividuated conditions, where the social or group identity is more salient than the 
individual identity, it would be reasonable to predict that with the strengthening of 
group norms, group polarization would occur as a result of normative social influence 
as opposed to persuasive argumentation or social comparison. This line of argument 
dovetails with that proffered by the Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects 
(SIDE) which suggests that online communication with its offer of anonymity and 
lack of social cues rather than being the great equalizer, could under certain 
conditions, result in a group identification that is stronger than in a similar face-to-face 
situation and as a result, conformity to group norms is also stronger.  In fact, 
polarization can be more extreme when group members are deindividuated and their 
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contributions are made anonymous (Kiesler et al., 1984; Postmes et al., 2002; Spears, 
Lea, & Lee, 1990).   
 
Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) 
Spears and Lea (1992) have suggested the social identity model of 
deindividuation effects (SIDE), incorporating aspects of deindividuation theory 
(Reicher, 1984) as well as social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) to explain the effects of 
anonymity and social identification within CMC.  Social identity theory and its 
extension, social categorization theory argues that individuals have multiple possible 
selves (Tajfel, 1978).  The self not only encompasses one’s individual identity, but 
also comprises social identities associated with valued group memberships.  The self-
concept may change from context to context when the situation makes different social 
identities salient (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).  Social identity 
is closely tied to norms that define how group members should think, feel and behave.  
In a context in which group membership is salient, members will assign these norms to 
themselves, employing the attributes of their social identity to define appropriate 
conduct for themselves in the social context (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2000).  
Based on social identity theory, Spears, Lea, & Lee (1990) proposed that under 
certain conditions, computer-mediated group communication could be 
deindividuating. Deindividuation denotes a situation in which there is a lack of 
individuating or personal information (Postmes et al., 2002).  In a deindividuated state, 
attention is shifted away from that of a personal self-identity to a social self-identity 
(Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1998).  
SIDE relies on the assumption that CMC’s lack of nonverbal cues filters out 
interpersonal and individuating information (Lea & Spears, 1992; Spears & Lea, 
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1992). In the absence of nonverbal cues, CMC participants use the remaining cues that 
signal common group identity as a basis of relating.  Visual anonymity in CMC 
attenuates the perception of intra-group differences, which would otherwise 
individuate group members and undermine the salience of the group. It tends to 
depersonalize perceptions of self and others and encourages behavior that is normative 
when group membership is made salient (Spears & Lea, 1992, 1994). Contextual cues 
and the content of others’ messages are not seen as individuating factors but are 
interpreted as signals that create or reinforce similarity within the group and as such, 
create and reinforce group norms.  Therefore, in contexts in which individuating 
information is scarce such as in a CMC context, the individual’s sensitivities to the 
salient social norms would be heightened. This results in an over-attribution process 
based upon stereotypical impressions of others.  Due to the paucity of individuating 
information available online, there is little to prompt participants to deconstruct these 
stereotypes. Group identification is therefore stronger and the self is seen in relation to 
the group.  
Deindividuation does not necessarily have equalizing effects as is commonly 
assumed but might instead lead to an accentuation of existing differences between 
social groups (Postmes & Spears, 1998; Spears & Lea, 1994).  Hence deindividuation 
might in fact enhance inter-group differences rather than reduce it.  When a common 
social identity of group membership is accessible, a deindividuated encounter in a 
group may divert attention away from the individual level of interaction and focus 
attention on the social level, thereby emphasizing the social boundaries of in-group 
and out-group. In other words, the lack of individuating cues in CMC can divert 
individuals’ attention away from idiosyncratic characteristics of group members, 
deindividuating person perceptions and making people more susceptible to group 
influence (Postmes et al., 1998; Spears et al., 2001; Tanis & Postmes, 2003).  
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Deindividuation leads to an attribution of greater similarity and liking for the group 
(Postmes et al., 1998; Reicher et al., 1995). 
What is important to note about the effects of anonymity and deindividuation 
is the relationship between the social context and the level of identity. According to 
SIDE, this positive group bias is nullified when users relate on the basis of 
individuating information and individual identities rather than group identities. If 
personal or individual identity is salient, the effects of isolation and anonymity will 
serve to further reduce the sense of being part of a group, thereby individuating the 
individual and removing the influence of the group and its social norms (Lea & 
Spears, 1991; Spears & Lea, 1992; Spears et al., 1990).  When personal identity is 
salient, anonymity and the lack of visual cues will further weaken the salience of 
group identity and thus undermine both conformity to in-group norms, and the 
tendency to engage in inter-group behavior. In these circumstances, CMC may weaken 
the power of the group over the individual.  However, if group identity is salient, the 
deindividuating conditions of isolation can strengthen the salience of group 
identification, so that people are more likely to conform to group norms and engage in 
inter-group behavior.  A point to note is that group norms may be situationally and 
locally defined, and hence may be quite independent and distinct from social norms 
that exist at the levels of communities and societies (Postmes & Spears, 1998; Sherif, 
1967).  
Spears, Lea, & Lee (1990) manipulated identifiability (low vs. high) and group 
salience (individual vs. group) as the two key variables in an experiment in which they 
hypothesized that when participants are deindividuated, adherence to group norms will 
be high and therefore group polarization will be more likely to occur. They predicted 
that the attitudes of the participants in deindividuated conditions (i.e. low 
identifiability and group salience) would become the most polarized. The results 
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confirmed the hypothesis that deindividuation resulted in increased sensitivity to 
situational norms and responsiveness to cues from the environment that indicate what 
would be the appropriate and desirable behavior in that particular context (Postmes et 
al., 1998). Participants who were deindividuated complied more strongly with the 
situational norm.  Thus on the whole, deindividuation appears to have increased the 
sensitivity to situational norms and the responsiveness to cues from the environment 
indicating what would be appropriate and desirable behavior in that particular context 
(Lea & Spears, 1992). 
Postmes, Spears and Lea (2002) showed that deindividuated groups diverged 
or became bipolarized when compared to individuated groups. Participants also 
identified more strongly with their own group in deindividuated conditions and 
perceived the out-group as more homogeneous.  Lee and Nass (2002) showed that 
even when interacting via the computer, people succumbed to group pressure when 
they believed that other people would see their responses.  This normative influence 
observed arose from the participants’ awareness that they were engaged in “social” 
interactions.  Their results seem to validate the SIDE model, which postulates that 
normative concerns persistently dictate human behaviors in CMC, especially when 
group identity is made salient.  The mere fact that other interactants would see the 
participant’s response apparently led to different reactions than they would have 
exhibited otherwise.  
Based on the SIDE model, choice shift and group polarization would therefore 
not be explained not via exchange of arguments or the pressure of social comparison 
but as an effect of normative influence.  An individual’s self-identification as a group 
member  leads him or her to an adherence to the group’s norms (Sassenberg & Boos, 
2003). Group norms emerge through interaction as a function of within group 
accommodation to a prototype that is inferred from in-group communication (Postmes 
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et al., 2000). This norm is either learned in earlier interactions, or in the case of an 
interacting group, it is the group prototype that is inferred from individual attitudes.  
The prototype is the attitude that differs least from the in-group members’ attitudes 
and most from the out-group members’.  When the context does not allow comparison 
with an out-group, the range of possible attitudes (i.e. the scale positions which are not 
held by in-group members) replaces the out-group as a comparison standard (Turner, 
1991).  The way in which norms are formed is not just the result of a passive 
perceptual process, but one of active negotiation and contestation within the group, 
limited by the group’s historical and ideological continuity (Reicher, Spears, & 
Postmes, 1995).  Such processes are especially likely to occur in CMC groups where 
certain features of the group may reinforce the normative pull of the group (Postmes et 
al., 1998).    
Deindividuation and group polarization 
From the extant literature, it appears that greater choice shift and group 
polarization occur when people make decisions in groups, regardless of whether the 
discussion takes place online or in a FTF context.  In fact, under conditions of 
deindividuation in the CMC context, greater choice shift and group polarization can 
occur, due to the strength of the group norm (Lee, 2006, 2007; Spears et al., 1990). 
Deindividuated subjects whose group identity was made salient exhibited the most 
norm-directed group polarization and those whose individual identity was made 
salient displayed the least.  Lee (2007) further examined the psychological mechanism 
underlying group polarization and found that group identification largely correlated 
with group polarization.  It was found that deindividuation increased conformity and 
amplified group influence not only by elevating normative concerns associated with 
group identification and in-group feelings but also by modifying an individual’s 
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cognitive representation and understanding of the group norm.  Participants in 
deindividuated groups were not only more inclined to conform towards the group 
norm, but they also thought that the group norm was more extreme as compared to 
participants in individuated groups (Lee, 2006). 
Lee asserts that not only do participants attributed greater similarity to their 
CMC partners when they did not exchange brief personal profiles prior to the group 
discussion, and this perceived within-group homogeneity facilitated conformity to 
group norms, but deindividuation might also affect the internalization of group norms 
through differential message processing (Lee, 2008).  
Insofar as people are motivated to make a correct decision, it seems like a 
reasonable assumption that people will think things through.  However 
deindividuation might trigger a different social influence process.  According to 
Kaplan (1989) informational influence is derived from a desire to make correct 
decisions, whereas normative influence is based on a desire to gain social acceptance 
or to maintain group harmony. He suggested also that normative influence occurs 
through little information-relevant thinking (peripheral processing) while 
informational influence involves the critical evaluations of the decision set (central 
processing).  
Furthermore, increased attention to the task as measured by message recall did 
not correspond to increased endorsement of the group norm (Lee, 2006). Neither did 
more positive evaluation of arguments correspond to greater group polarization (Lee, 
2007).  Thus, it appears that when group polarization occurs, it is due mainly to the 
normative influence of the group, rather than persuasive arguments or informational 
influence.   In summary, it appears that participants in deindividuated groups have 
greater perceived homogeneity to other group members, a stronger group identity, a 
stronger norm agreement, greater norm conformity and perceive the norm to be more 
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extreme than those in the individuated condition.  As such, they would therefore make 
more extreme decisions (Lee, 2007).   
This leads to my first research question that examines the role of normative 
influence and individuating information on group and individual decision-making. An 
examination of norm conformity and group polarization can serve to elucidate if any 
change in decision was due to informational influence or normative influence.   Norm 
conformity refers to the difference between the individual’s post-discussion decision 
and the group’s decision, while group polarization refers to the difference between the 
individual’s decision after the discussion and the individual’s decision before the 
discussion.  
In the individuated group, participants would be more likely to exhibit 
resistance to group norms when making their individual decisions and show less of a 
cognitive change. This implies that when individuated groups do exhibit group 
polarization and choice shift, they would be conforming to group norms because of 
conformity pressure and not because of an internal change in beliefs. However, the 
literature also seems to suggest that although there might be a shift in the group’s 
decision, the individuals within a group might not all be in agreement with the 
decision.    
In line with the deindividuation effects put forth by the SIDE model, it is 
hypothesized that participants in deindividuated groups would show greater agreement 
with the group’s decision than the participants in individuated groups. By measuring 
the difference between the group’s decision and the participant’s post-discussion 
decision, it would be possible to see if norm conformity was due to a conversion of 
attitudes or compliance to the group. There should be no differences between 
individuated and deindividuated groups if conversion of attitudes were at work since 
both groups would have been exposed to the same materials with the only difference 
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being the salience of the group identity.  However, if compliance to the group was at 
work, we should see that those participants in deindividuated groups conforming more 
to the norm while those in the individuated condition conforming less.  This would be 
shown by a greater difference between the group decision and the participant’s post-
discussion decision for those participants in the individuated groups than in the 
deindividuated groups.  
 
RQ1: What is the effect of normative influence on group and individual 
decision-making? 
 
H1: Participants in individuated groups will show less norm conformity than 
those in deindividuated groups. 
 
In a similar vein, if normative influence was in operation, participants in 
individuated groups should hold more strongly to their own decisions and even though 
they might shift their views to accommodate the group’s decision, their opinions 
would not change much between the pre and post discussions.  Hence there should be 
a greater difference between the pre-discussion decision and the post-discussion 
decision for those participants in the individuated groups than the deindividuated 
groups.  
 
H2: Participants in individuated groups will show less group polarization than 
those in deindividuated groups.  
 
As mentioned earlier in the literature, not only do individuals make more 
extreme decisions in deindividuated groups as compared to individuated groups, the 
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groups themselves make more extreme decisions (Lee, 2007).  This can be measured 
by looking at the choice shift, which is the difference between the group decision and 
the pre-discussion decision.   Individuated groups should be better able to resist group 
pressure and be less extreme in their decisions.  Therefore, there should be a greater 
difference between the group decision and the pre-discussion decision for those 
participants in the individuated groups than the deindividuated groups 
 
H3: Participants in individuated groups will show less choice shift than those 
in deindividuated groups. 
 
The first three hypotheses share a common independent variable of 
individuating information.  Individuating information was operationalized as the 
sharing of personal information such as hobbies, likes and dislikes, major and 
hometown.  In H1, the dependent variable was norm conformity, while in H2 and H3, 
the dependent were group polarization and choice shift respectively.  
Most of the studies conducted on group decision-making do not engage strong 
pressure for the group to conclude a discussion nor do they require the group to come 
to a unanimous conclusion. Lee’s research (2006, 2007) for example, required the 
participants to discuss the topics but did not require them to come to a group 
consensus on the issue or to make  a unanimous decision. It has frequently been found 
that groups have more difficulty in making unanimous decisions and they take longer 
to reach unanimous decisions than they do majority decisions (Foss, 1981; Miller, 
1985; Nemeth, 1977). Kaplan and Miller (1987) found that the decision rule has a 
moderating effect on the type of influence employed in the decision making process, 
with the shift being the greatest in groups in which were required to reach a 
unanimous decision. One reason was that under a majority rule, extreme individuals 
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could be ignored as the others in the group had neither to influence them nor concede 
to them in order to reach a decision.  However under unanimity rule, members tried to 
persuade each other not only on the basis of facts or informational influence but also 
with statements of appropriateness and expressions of preferences.  Thus decisions 
under unanimity conditions as opposed to majority rule should give greater influence 
to extreme deviates in either direction.   
Thus acquiescence to norms might be stronger in decision contexts requiring 
the reaching of a group consensus.   This leads to the possibility that the mode of 
deliberation i.e. a discussion or a decision-making situation might influence the 
normative influence of the group and subsequently, on group polarization.  
 
RQ2: What is the effect of consensus decision on decision-making? 
 
H4: Participants in groups that are required to come to a consensus will show 
greater group polarization than those that do not. 
 
For H4, the independent variable is deliberation and was operationalized as 
discussion leading to a group decision. The dependent variable was group polarization. 
So far, studies in choice shift whether it be in the online or the face-to-face 
context have used scenarios with very rational decisions.  Existing research looks at 
risk via an economic lens or via the rational perspective and most of the research so 
far has been in a business or economic setting. Risk issues have been known to work 
differently. Literature from risk communication has shown that people think about and 
react to risky issues differently than they would to economic or intellectual issues. 
Currently, there has yet to be any studies conducted which examines how people make 
decisions about risky issues online.  
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Risk Perception 
People do not perceive the world in a vacuum and the way that we perceive 
risk is not a solitary individual activity.  The individual is situated in society and this 
affects the way that he perceives situations and events. An important aspect, which 
influences the way that an individual perceives risk, is that of the group affiliations 
that the individual has. The individual’s social affiliations might influence the way that 
an individual views a particular risk and might also serve to amplify the severity of the 
risk.  Research on perception of risk has found that membership in social groups shape 
the selection of information that the individual regard as important. Interpretations that 
are inconsistent with existing beliefs are often ignored or attenuated and are intensified 
if the information is in accord with existing beliefs (Freudenburg, 1988; Slovic, 1987).  
According to Kasperson (1992), adherence to group norms is one way by 
which risks are amplified. Group membership and role identification shapes the 
salience of various aspects of the information that one receives. Individuals or groups 
select specific characteristics of these events or aspects of the associated depictions 
and interpret them according to their perceptions and mental schemes. They also 
communicate these interpretations to other individuals and groups and receive 
interpretations in return.  These groups in turn process the information and respond 
accordingly in light of their existing views, schemas, knowledge, beliefs and concerns 
(Kasperson, 1992; Kasperson et al., 1988).  
Risk can be defined as being “in part the threat of direct harm that happens to 
people and their environments regardless of their social constructs, and in part the 
threat associated with the social conceptions and structures that shape the nature of 
other hands (to people, corporations, social institutions, communities, and values)” 
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(Kasperson, 1992).  Risk perception research has shown that an individual’s 
perception of risk is based on a variety of factors other than a technical probabilistic 
assessment of risk.  Factors such as the level of knowledge or familiarity with the risk, 
the amount of dread associated with the risk, the voluntariness of undertaking the risk 
as well as the benefits accruable from undertaking the risk all play a part in an 
individual’s risk perception and acceptance of a risk. In addition, the stigma associated 
with the risk as well as culture of the society of which the individual is part of, also 
has an influence on the way that the individual is oriented towards the risk (Slovic, 
1987).  Thus, in defining a risk there is the technical component of risk which hinges 
on the probability of events and the magnitude of consequences, as well as a social or 
perceptual analysis of the hazard (Freudenburg, 1988). 
Slovic and his colleagues (1992) in their research on the perception of risk 
found that risk is also inherently subjective.  It does not exist independent of our 
minds and cultures but humans have invented the concept of risk to help them 
understand and to cope with the dangers and uncertainties of life. Their psychometric 
paradigm assumed that risk is subjectively defined by individuals who may be 
influenced by a wide array of psychological, social, institutional, and cultural factors.  
They showed that the concept of risk meant different things to different people. When 
experts judged risk, their responses correlated to technical estimates of annual 
fatalities. When laypeople judged risk, their judgment was affected by other factors 
such as catastrophic potential, controllability, threat to future generations, and as a 
result differed considerably from their own and experts’ estimates of annual fatalities.    
Research has also shown that the layperson sees risk as consisting of many 
qualitative characteristics such as knowledge of risk, perceived risk and benefit, 
controllability, voluntariness, and dread.  In fact, the feeling of dread was the major 
determinant of public perception and acceptance of risk for a wide variety of hazards, 
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and the layperson’s risk perception and attitudes are closely related to the how they 
feel about the dread factor.  The higher a hazard scored on the dread factor, the higher 
the perceived risk, the more people want to see its current risk reduced and the more 
they want to see strict regulations employed to achieve the desired reduction in risk. In 
contrast, experts’ opinions of risk are not closely related to these characteristics but 
they see risk as synonymous with expected annual mortality (Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1979).  Due to the fact that the underlying way that laypeople view risk 
is qualitatively different from the way that experts view risk, expert recitation of risk 
statistics will often do little to change people’s attitudes and perceptions.  
There are 2 fundamental ways in which humans understand risk. The “analytic 
system” utilizes algorithms and rules such as probability, logic, and technical risk 
assessments, while the “experiential system” is intuitive and mostly automatic, and 
often not accessible to human consciousness.  This experiential system remains the 
most natural and common way to respond to risk and it relies on images and 
associations linked by experience to emotion and affect (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2004).  This was echoed in Epstein’s (1994) view that there are two ways 
that people apprehend reality.  One is via the intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal, 
narrative and experiential way and the other is via the analytic, deliberative, verbal and 
rational manner. Research has shown that affective and emotional processes interact 
with reason-based analysis in all normal thinking and indeed are essential to 
rationality (Damasio, 1994).  
Affect. 
The earliest studies of risk perception found that whereas risk and benefit tend 
to be positively correlated in the world, they are negatively correlated in people’s 
minds and judgments (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978). Risk 
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perception is not a deliberative cognitive process.  It is colored by one’s affective 
judgment. It is highly dependent on intuitive and experiential thinking and is guided 
by emotional and affective processes. Zajonc (1980) argued that affective reactions to 
stimuli are often the very first reactions, occurring automatically and subsequently 
guiding information processing, and judgment, and that all perceptions contain affect 
to some degree.  
One of the characteristics of the experiential system is its reliance on affect.  
Affect is a subtle form of emotion, defined as positive (like) or negative (dislike) 
evaluative feelings toward an external stimulus.   Such evaluations occur rapidly and 
automatically.  Reliance on affect is a quicker, easier and more efficient way of 
making judgments and to navigate a complex, uncertain and sometimes dangerous 
world.  Alhakami and Slovic (1994) found that people based their judgment of an 
activity or technology not only on what they think about it but also how they feel 
about it.  If their feelings toward an activity are favorable, they are moved towards 
judging the risks as low and the benefits as high but if their feelings towards it are 
unfavorable, they tend to judge the opposite. Therefore, affect comes before judgment 
and directs judgments of risk and benefits. They termed this process the “affect 
heuristic”, and they propose that if a general affective view guides perceptions of risk 
and benefit, providing information about benefit should change perception of risk and 
vice versa.   
Building upon the Alhakami and Slovic (1994) study, Finucane, Alhakami, 
Slovic and Johnson (2000)  purported that people used an affect heuristic in judging 
risk.  People consult or refer to an ‘affective pool’ which contain all the positive and 
negative images associated with the object or activity being judged.  An inverse 
relationship between risk and benefit evaluations occurs because they are derived from 
a common affective source. Their study supported the notion that risk and benefit 
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judgments are influenced in part at least by the overall affective evaluation and that 
people used affect to make judgments and that affect is an important evaluation 
mechanism in risk perception.  They also found an inverse relationship between 
perceived risks and benefits when time pressure was introduced.  The affect heuristic 
comes into play especially when the opportunity for analytic deliberation is reduced 
and an efficient mode of judgment is needed. This result was replicated in Ganzach’s 
(2001) study of financial risk taking. These studies demonstrate that affect influences 
judgment directly and is not a mere response to a prior analytic evaluation.  
Lowenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch (2001) noted that when the situation is 
uncertain, people tend to have a none or all response that is sensitive to the possibility 
rather than the probability of strong positive or negative consequences.   This explains 
why societal concerns about hazards such as nuclear power and exposure to small 
amounts of toxic chemicals fail to recede in response to information about the very 
small probabilities of the feared consequences from such hazards.  Rottenstreich and 
Hsee (2001) showed that if the potential outcome is emotionally powerful, its 
attractiveness or unattractiveness is relatively insensitive to changes in probability 
even if the change was to be as great as from 0.99 to 0.01.  
The content or the nature of the issue under consideration would also have an 
effect on the sort of influence likely to emerge in decision-making. Laughlin and his 
colleagues (Laughlin, 1980; Laughlin & Earley, 1982) have proposed that many issues 
on which groups make decision can be located along a continuum.  At one end of the 
continuum are intellective issues for which there are or are considered to be 
demonstrably correct answers.  At the other end of the continuum are moral issues, 
which involve behavioral, ethical or aesthetic judgments for which there are no 
demonstrably correct answers.  For moral issues, the right answer is achieved by 
reaching consensus.  This however does not imply that intellective issues involve no 
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moral component or appeal to consensus of preferences, for all knowledge rests on an 
implicit social consensus about the logical and epistemological bases of that 
knowledge (Laughlin, 1980; Laughlin & Earley, 1982). Nor does the distinction mean 
that moral issues do not have an intellective component.  Rather it implies that for 
moral issues, the facts alone do not determine the choice of an alternative (McGrath, 
1984).  The preferred alternative depends not on the marshalling of facts and the 
discovery of truth but on the assertion of preference and the attainment of consensus. 
Intellective issues appear to lead to heavier use of informational influence 
during group discussion, whereas moral issues appear to evoke the use of normative 
influence (Kaplan, 1989; Kaplan & Miller, 1987). The issue type also appears to be 
influenced by the imposed decision rule. The greater use of normative influence when 
the issue is moral and of informational influence when the issue is intellective tends to 
increase when the decision rule is that of unanimity rather than of majority consensus.  
Extant research has yet to look into how people make decisions if the issue on 
hand is one with a risk element instead of being intellective or moral. Risk issues are 
contextually different from either intellective or moral issues and they often appeal to 
the visceral or affective components within us.  As such, it would be interesting to 
note the effect of a risk issue on choice shifts and group polarization within an online 
group decision-making context.   This leads me to my third and last research question, 
which looks at the content of the issue under discussion.  It is hypothesized that when 
groups have to make a unanimous decision concerning a risk issue, there would be a 
greater choice shift than when making a decision on either intellective or moral issues.  
Therefore depending on the issue at hand, the cognitive process that goes into the 
decision making process would differ.  Hence, a risk issue would serve to elicit more 
of an intuitive decision making framework and this would be prone to normative 
influence much more than if the issue was one that was more intellective or moral. 
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When the content of the issue is risky, the decision-making process would be subject 
to greater normative influence.  
 
RQ3: What is the effect of the content of the issue on decision-making? 
H5: Decisions regarding risky issues will show a greater choice shift than 
intellectual or moral issues.  
  
H6:  Decisions regarding risky issues will show a greater group polarization 
than intellectual or moral issues.    
 
H7: Decisions regarding risky issues will show a greater norm conformity than 
intellectual or moral issues.    
 
In the last three hypotheses, the independent variable was story content and 
was operationalized as the content of the issue under consideration.  In this study, 
there were three different story types.  They were intellectual stories that had a clear-
cut right and wrong answer, moral stories that had a judgmental element to the stories 
and risk stories, which had an element of danger and were meant to provoke a visceral 
response. The dependent variables were choice shift for H5, group polarization for H6 
and norm conformity for H7.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODS 
 
Research Design  
A 2 (decision/discussion) x 2 (individuated/deindividuated CMC) factorial 
experiment was designed to examine how an environment with a heightened social 
identity affects the decision-making process, in particular with regards to the making 
of extreme decisions. The first factor was deliberation.  This was divided into the 
decision condition in which the groups were asked to come to a consensus decision 
after the group discussion and the discussion condition in which the groups were only 
told to share their views and to discuss the issues.  The second factor was 
individuating information.  This was comprised of the individuated CMC condition in 
which personal information was shared and the deindividuated CMC condition, 
whereby the participants were told to start the discussion immediately and not to 
divulge any personal information.  The research design is presented as a figure below. 
 
 Individuating Information 
 
 Individuated Deindividuated 
Decision 13 x 3 = 39 13 x 3 = 39 Deliberation 
Discussion 12 x 3 = 36 13 x 3 = 39 
Figure 1. Research Design 
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Participants.  
Student participants (N = 153) were recruited from several classes in 
communication for a “group online decision making” experiment. They were offered 
either extra credit or a monetary incentive ($10) for their participation.  The age of the 
participants ranged from 19 to 52 (M = 19.98, SD = 3.373), 35.9% of the participants 
were male and 64.1% of them were female.  The sample consisted of 24.3% freshmen, 
48.4% sophomores, 14.4% juniors, and 13.1% seniors.  One person in a group from 
the individuated/decision condition did not complete the post-discussion questionnaire 
and that group was dropped from the analysis.  
Procedure 
When the participants arrived for the experiment, they were randomly assigned 
to one of the four experimental conditions.  They were placed in separate rooms each 
equipped with a laptop computer. They were told that they would be taking part in a 
group decision-making exercise and would be interacting with 2 other participants.  As 
the participants were shuttled to their respective rooms immediately upon arrival, there 
was no opportunity for them to meet or get to know each other prior to the start of the 
experiment. 
At the start of the experiment, participants were presented with a questionnaire 
consisting of the 6 choice dilemmas and asked to give their individual judgments on 
these dilemmas.  After the participants had made their decisions, they were requested 
to take part in a group discussion about the dilemmas via CMC.  Those in the decision 
condition were asked to come to a consensus in which everyone in the group had to 
agree with the decision.  In the discussion condition, participants were asked to share 
their opinions on each dilemma, but not to arrive at group consensus. 
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The participants communicated with each other via the synchronous Windows 
Live Messenger System, which is a popular online instant messaging system. This is a 
freeware instant messaging system developed and distributed by Microsoft. It allows 
synchronous communication whereby users can communicate online in real time. 
Seeing as to how most college students utilize one form or another of these instant 
messaging systems, such as Yahoo! Messenger or AOL Instant Messaging, there was 
no problem with the participants being acquainted with this chat system.   
A conversation window for the discussion was opened on the computers and 
participants typed their responses into an input box at the bottom of the conversation 
window.  The messages scrolled upwards as the participants typed in their responses.  
In the conversation window, participants could when the other participants were 
typing their responses. A transcript of the conversation was automatically captured 
and stored on the computers.   
Participants were told that they had about an hour to talk about the issues.  At 
then end of the time frame, those in the decision condition were told to come to a 
decision and those in the discussion condition were told to wrap up their discussion.   
Most groups took between 45 to 75 minutes for their conversations.  They were all 
then requested to complete the questionnaire regarding the choice dilemmas once 
again on their own.  This time they were told that often having been in a group 
discussion might affect people’s decisions and that they might not have agreed with 
the decisions of the group or other group members.  They were also given a 
questionnaire, which contained questions pertaining to demographics as well group 
identity and group satisfaction.  Finally, they were then debriefed and thanked.  
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Manipulation of Identity  
Group and individual identity was manipulated by the giving of different 
instructions directly before the discussion.  In the individuated condition, the 
participants were told that they would be discussing the dilemmas with students 
majoring in other subjects. They were told to share personal information such as 
college, major, hometown, hobbies, the sports they played and the music or movies 
that they enjoyed.  They were told to discuss these issues for about 5 minutes before 
the start of the group discussion.  The instructions also highlighted the advantages of 
having people with different opinions and backgrounds in a discussion. For those in 
the deindividuated condition, the participants were told that they were all students in 
the same major and the advantages of group work and group cohesion was 
highlighted.  Those in the individuated condition were also asked to jot down the 
characteristics of the other group members as individuals, while those in the 
deindividuated condition were asked to write down the characteristics of their group. 
The participants were also consistently referred to as either group members or 
individual participants throughout the course of the experiment. These instructions 
were similar to those used by Walther (1997).  (For details of manipulation, please see 
Appendix 2 and 3). 
To maintain anonymity, personal names were not used.  Those in the 
individuated condition were given the screen names of Individual 1, 2 or 3 while those 
in the deindividuated condition were referred to as Group Member 1, 2 or 3.  In 
addition, those in the individuated condition had different pictures/icons attached to 
their screen names, while for those in the deindividuated condition had identical 
pictures of either a horse, a chess board, a dog or a beach scene attached to their screen 
names. The choice of the pictures was random.  The following are two examples of 
 43 
what a chat session looks like.  The first is taken from a transcript from an 
individuated group, while the second is a transcript from a deindividuated group. 
 
Individual 1 says (12:02 PM): hey 
Individual 2 says (12:02 PM): hi 
Individual 3 says (12:02 PM): hiii 
Individual 1 says (12:02 PM): sorry for taking so long... I had to eat lunch 
Individual 3 says (12:02 PM): nice of you to join us 
Individual 2 says (12:02 PM): haha, its okay 
Individual 3 says (12:03 PM): where are you from #1 
Individual 1 says (12:03 PM): um, Malone, NY... about 5 minutes from the Canadian 
border 
Individual 1 says (12:03 PM): you? 
Individual 3 says (12:04 PM): monroe, new york- 40 minutes outside the city 
Individual 2 says (12:04 PM): i feel so left out... not from ny but nc 
Figure 2. Transcript of the beginning of a session for an individuated group. 
 
Group Member 1 says: (4:56:23 PM): hey 
Group Member 2 says: (4:56:26 PM): hi 
Group Member 3 says: (4:56:30 PM): hello 
Group Member 2 says: (4:56:49 PM): i feel the male in the situation should be 
confronted 
Group Member 3 says: (4:56:55 PM): i do too 
Group Member 1 says: (4:57:00 PM): yes i put 100% 
Group Member 2 says: (4:57:09 PM): and whether or not i confront the female would 
be dependent on his response 
Group Member 3 says: (4:57:14 PM): oh i put 90 
Group Member 3 says: (4:57:22 PM): but we can do 100 
Group Member 1 says: (4:57:38 PM): i would just want to see what he has to say and 
get his side of the story 
Group Member 3 says: (4:57:55 PM): yea i wouldnt tell the female 
Group Member 1 says: (4:58:01 PM): i 
Group Member 2 says: (4:58:03 PM): why not? 
Figure 3. Transcript of the beginning of a session for a deindividuated group. 
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The Choice Dilemmas   
There were six choice dilemma scenarios that the participants were asked to 
give their responses to. There were two intellect-based, two moral-based and two risk-
based scenarios.  In contrast to the original Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (Wallach 
et al., 1962), the scenarios presented in this study, although still hypothetical were 
revised so as to make them more personally relevant to the college-aged participants. 
The moral-based scenarios were adapted from two of the four scenarios used in 
previous research by Burgoon & Hale (1988) and which have been shown to be 
capable of generating multiple perspectives in response to moral dilemmas.   They 
were chosen because they comprised of questions that encompassed a 
moral/judgmental element but did not bring with them the element of risk. The 
intellect-based scenarios were adapted from Tversky and Kahneman (1981).  They 
comprised of questions which had a right and wrong albeit not clear-cut answer.   
The risk-based scenarios were specially devised for this study.  Prior to the 
start of this study, several possible scenarios were created that bore an element of risk.  
These scenarios were then presented to a sample of undergraduates who were asked to 
rank them according to which they felt were the most realistic and applicable to them.  
These undergraduates were separately recruited and were different from those who 
participated in the study. Recruitment was via the snowball technique and the sample 
of consisted of 20 undergraduates from across the various colleges in the university.  
The top two scenarios were included in the study.  Finally, the order of the 
presentation of the dilemmas was randomized (Please see Appendix 1 for the 
dilemmas used). 
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Variables/Measures  
The variables in this study are presented in the following table: 
Table 1. 
Variables in Study 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
  
Individuating information Norm conformity 
Deliberation Choice shift 
Gender Group polarization 
Story content  
 
Norm conformity was operationalized as the difference between the 
individual’s decisions after the discussion and the group decision made.  This was 
measured by taking the difference between the responses given to individual 
questionnaire answered after the discussion with the group decision as recorded in the 
questionnaire answered during the discussion.  
Choice shift was operationalized as the difference between the individual’s 
pre-discussion decision and the group’s decision. This was measured by taking the 
difference between the responses given to individual questionnaire answered before 
the discussion with the group decision as recorded in the questionnaire answered 
during the discussion.  
Group polarization was operationalized as the difference between the 
individual’s pre and post discussion decision. This was measured by taking the 
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difference between the responses given to individual questionnaire answered before 
the discussion with the responses given to the individual questionnaire answered after 
the discussion.  
Several studies have shown that gender has an effect on opinion change and 
decision-making. For example, Adrianson (2001) looked at opinion change in 
asynchronous CMC (emails) and FTF groups and found that females changed their 
opinions more than males did overall but especially in the CMC anonymous condition, 
while there was a higher opinion change in males in the FTF condition than in the 
other conditions. Diberardinis, Ramage and Levitt (1984) in their study of gender and 
risky shift found that females shifted the least in each treatment group and males 
shifted the most. In addition, several studies have found that demographic variables 
such as age and gender are associated with the willingness to speak out on 
controversial issues (Lasorsa,1991; Salmon & Neuwirth, 1990; Scheufele et al., 2001). 
Therefore, gender was used as a control variable in this study. 
In addition, the participants were also asked about their levels of group identity 
and group satisfaction. Group identity was measured by items from Spears, Lea and 
Lee (1990) group identity scale, Tyler’s (1999) shared identity scale and McCrosky 
and McCain (1974) social attraction scale.   Group cohesiveness was measured by 
items from Seashore’s (1974) group cohesiveness scale and group satisfaction was 
measured by items from Gouran’s (1973) satisfaction scale. (For details of measures, 
please see Appendix 4).  The group norm was not prescribed and as such the group 
decision was taken as the group norm.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Manipulation Check for Identity 
The present study employed a manipulation for identity in which either the 
group or the individual identity of the participants was highlighted. Hence the 
participants were either in a condition in which their group had either a deindividuated 
or an individuated identity. A manipulation check in which the participants were asked 
to complete several questions that assessed how much they identified with, as well as 
how much they felt that they belonged with their groups was conducted to ascertain 
that the manipulation was successful. The questions were adapted from the scales used 
by Spears, Lea and Lee’s (1990) group identity scale as well as items from Tyler’s 
(1999) shared identity scale and McCrosky and McCain (1974) social attraction scale.  
An index for identification was created consisting of 6 items taken from these 
scales. A factor analysis (varimax rotation with eigenvalue greater than 1) was 
conducted on an initial 12 items to ensure that all items were actually measuring the 
same concept and was part of a single construct.   However, results revealed that the 
12 items loaded onto 2 factors explaining 57.35% of the total variance. The first factor 
had items corresponding to the concept of loyalty to the group while the other factor 
had items corresponding to group identification and similarity with other members of 
the group.  As the manipulation test was for group identity, the decision was made to 
use the 6 items corresponding to the concept of group identification and similarity 
with other members of the group to form the index of identification.  
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The scale consisting of these 6 items was found to be reliable (Cronbach’s α = 
.7, n = 152).   An ANOVA was run to compare the means between the 2 conditions 
and it was found that the level of identification with the group was significantly higher 
F (1, 151) = 12.71, p < .001 for groups in the deindividuated condition (M = 3.37, SD 
= .45, n = 152) as compared to those in the individuated condition (M = 3.08, SD = 
.53, n = 152). 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
The design of this study has a hierarchical structure in which individuals were 
nested within groups, thus leading to a problem of non-independence of observations 
as nesting has the tendency to produce within-group homogeneity. Therefore ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression was not a suitable method of analysis as the non-
independence of observation violates one of the basic assumptions of OLS regression.  
The hierarchical or multilevel linear model (MLM) was used instead.  
The MLM is a type of regression model that is particularly suitable for 
multilevel data.  It differs from the usual regression models in that the equation 
defining the mixed model contains more than one error term, i.e. there is one (or more) 
error term for each level of the model (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). In addition, MLMs 
also provide the flexibility of modeling the variances and covariances of the means of 
the data (Browne & Rasbash, 2000; Hox, 1995; Singer, 1988).  
A common critique of OLS regression is that it places too much attention on 
the individual and does not take into account the context that the individuals are 
located in, such as the social and institutional contexts (Bickel, 2007). For example, 
the teachers, facilities and even the socioeconomic environment of the school could 
have an effect on the education attainment of the children in the school.  Fitting a 
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model that does not recognize the existence of clustering creates serious technical 
problems such as the underestimation of standard errors of regression coefficients, 
which might obscure the fact that what appears to be a significant difference can be 
actually ascribed to chance, in other words, it increases the chances of committing a 
Type 1 error.  Correct standard errors would only be estimated if variations at both the 
individual and the cluster levels were allowed for in the analysis.   
In order to determine if nesting is consequential, the unconditional intraclass 
correlation is computed by dividing the variance between groups by the total variance. 
If the coefficient is statistically significant, this implies that a significant portion of the 
total variance can be explained by cluster membership and thus a multilevel model 
would provide substantial benefits over a standard fixed effects model. Any effects 
found for the nesting variable would imply that there is an effect due to the individual 
being in a particular group and hence there might be greater similarities for answers 
given by those being in that particular group.  These effects need therefore be 
accounted for in the model as this effect is due to group that the individuals belong to 
and not to the condition that the group is in. 
MLM addresses these problems by simultaneously modeling processes at all 
levels of the population hierarchy.  It allows the slopes and intercepts of the variables 
of interest to vary from group to group and allows for the modeling of variance 
structure and estimates effects of predictors at the group level at the same time taking 
in account the unobserved group level variability. By focusing attention on all levels 
of the hierarchy in the population, multilevel modeling enables one to understand 
where and how effects are occurring. Thus it accounts for variability at each level of 
data and provides estimations of both the fixed as well as the random factors for 
individuals nested within groups (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998).  
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To test the various hypotheses, the main effect and all the possible interactions 
among the relevant variables were included in the first run of the model.  Non-
significant terms were removed and the process repeated until only the significant 
effects remained. 
 
Effect of Normative Influence on Decision-Making 
Research Question 1: What is the effect of normative influence on decision-making?  
Research question 1 examines whether normative influence drives opinion 
change in online groups.  It also looks at how individuating information affects 
decision-making, in particular its effects on the individual’s decision in relation to the 
group’s decision.   
 
Hypothesis 1: Participants in individuated groups will show less norm conformity than 
those in deindividuated groups. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants in individuated groups would conform 
less to the group decision than those in deindividuated groups. This implies that the 
deindividuated participants show greater agreement with the group’s decision than the 
individuated participants, which translates into a greater difference between the 
individual post-discussion decision and the group decision for the individuated 
participants.  
The first analysis was a saturated omnibus test, which included the main 
effects and all the possible interactions between the variables of interest.  
Individuating information and gender were entered as fixed effects while group was 
entered as the random effect. Prior attitude, which was measured by the answers given 
in the pre-discussion questionnaire, was entered as a covariate control variable. Norm 
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conformity was the dependent variable, which was measured by taking the difference 
between the answers given in the group decision and the answers given by the 
participants individually after the group discussion. 
As the interaction between gender and identity was insignificant F (1, 59.468) 
= 1.961, p = .167, the interaction term was dropped and the analysis was run for the 
main effects of the variables on norm conformity.  The data showed that neither 
gender was significant F (1, 63.518) = 1.425, p = .237 nor identity was significant F 
(1, 19.058) = .631, p = .437. 
 
Table 2. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 63.518 1.425 .237 
Individuating Information 1 19.058 .631 .437 
Prior Attitude 1 64.035 6.887 .011 
 
The difference between the individual post-discussion decision and the group 
decision of the participants in the individuated groups was (M = -.03, SE = 1.144, n = 
21.965) while that of the deindividuated groups was (M = -1.238, SE = 1.087 n = 
20.92).  However, the overall MLM showed that individuating information was not 
significant and so H1 was not supported. 
 
 
 
 
 52 
Table 3. 
Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity 
Individuating Information M SE F p 
     
Individuated -.03 1.144 
Deindividuated -1.238 1.087 
.631 .437 
 
The variance within groups was 38.671 (SE = 8.245) while the variance 
between groups was 1.299 (SE = 5.679), resulting in an intraclass correlation of 
1.299/(1.299 + 38.671) = .032. This implies that there is a slight clustering effect and 
about 3.2% of the variance can be explained by group membership.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Participants in individuated groups will show less group polarization 
than those in deindividuated groups. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants in individuated groups would show 
less group polarization than those in deindividuated groups. Group polarization was 
measured by the difference between the individual’s decision before the discussion 
and the individual’s decision after the discussion.  The MLM was run with identity 
and gender as fixed effects and with group as the random effect. 
The data failed to show any significance for the interaction F (1, 133.364) = 
2.976, p = .087. After removing the interaction, the main effects of individuating 
information F (1, 48.09) = .643, p = .427 or gender F (1, 134.268) = .001, p = .982 
still failed to show any significance, hence H2 was not supported. 
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Table 4. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 134.268 .001 .982 
Individuating Information 1 48.090 .643 .427 
 
The difference between the individual post-discussion decision and their initial 
pre-discussion decision for the participants in the individuated groups was (M = 1.563, 
SE = 1.221, n = 52.370) while that of those in the deindividuated groups was (M = 
.241, SE = 1.151 n = 49.197).  
 
Table 5. 
Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on Group Polarization 
Individuating Information M SE F p 
     
Individuated 1.563 1.221 
Deindividuated .241 1.151 
.643 .427 
 
The variance within groups was 73.901 (SE = 10.596) while the variance 
between groups was 8.730 (SE = 7.764), resulting in an intraclass correlation of 
8.730/82.631 = .11. This implies that there is a slight clustering effect as about 11% of 
the variance can be explained by group membership.   
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Hypothesis 3: Participants in individuated groups will show less choice shift than 
those in deindividuated groups. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants in individuated groups would show 
less choice shift than those in deindividuated groups. Choice shift was measured by 
taking the difference between the group’s decision after discussion and the 
individual’s decision before the discussion. MLM was run with the variables 
individuating information and gender as fixed effects and group as the random effect.  
The data failed to show any significance for the interaction F (1, 61.637) = .463, p = 
.499. After removing the interaction, the main effects of identity F (1, 21.33) = .434, p 
= .517 or gender F (1, 63.384) = .142, p = .708 still failed to show any significance. 
H3 was not supported. 
 
Table 6. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Choice Shift 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 63.384 .142 .708 
Individuating Information 1 21.330 .434 .517 
 
The difference between the initial pre-discussion decision and the group 
decision for the participants in the individuated groups was (M = 1.486, SE = 1.866, n 
= 24.306) while those in the deindividuated groups was (M = -.155, SE = 1.777 n = 
23.286).   
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Table 7. 
Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on Choice Shift 
Individuating Information M SE F p 
     
Individuated 1.486 1.866 
Deindividuated -.155 1.777 
.434 .517 
 
The variance within groups was 94.608 (SE = 19.596) while the variance 
between groups was 6.589 (SE = 13.81), resulting in an intraclass correlation of 
6.589/(6.589 + 94.608) = .065. This implies that there is a slight clustering effect, 
about 6.5% of the variance can be explained by group membership. 
 
Effect of Consensus 
Research Question 2: What is the effect of consensus on decision-making? 
The second research question looked at how the need to come to a unanimous 
decision affected group and individual decision-making.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Participants in groups that are required to come to a consensus will 
show greater group polarization than those that do not. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that participants in groups that are required to come to 
a consensus would show greater group polarization than those that do not. Again, 
group polarization was measured by the difference between the individual’s decision 
before the discussion and the individual’s decision after the discussion.  MLM was run 
with deliberation and gender as fixed effects and with group as the random effect.  The 
interaction failed to reach significance F (1, 133.265) = 2.546, p = .461 and was 
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removed.  The analysis was re-run with only the main effects and neither deliberation 
F (1, 47.896) = .747, p = .392 or gender F (1, 134.437) = .011, p = .918 managed to 
reached significance.  Therefore, H4 was not supported.  
 
 
 
Table 8. 
Effect of Deliberation on Group Polarization 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 134.437 .011 .6818 
Deliberation 1 47.89 .747 .392 
 
The variance within groups was 73.959 (SE = 10.611) while the variance 
between groups was 8.586 (SE = 7.758), resulting in an intraclass correlation of 
8.586/82.545 = .104. This implies that there is a slight clustering effect as about 10.4% 
of the variance can be explained by group membership.   
 
Table 9. 
Details of the Effects of Deliberation on Group Polarization 
Deliberation M SE F p 
     
Decision 1.557 1.171 
Discussion .136 1.196 
.747 .392 
 
Pairwise comparisons showed that the group polarization for the participants 
who had to come to a consensus was (M = 1.557, SE = 1.171, n = 49.08) while those 
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who did not was (M = .136, SE = 1.196, n = 52.156).  The analysis however showed 
that this difference was not significant. 
 
Effect of Content/Issue Type 
Research Question 3: What is the effect of content on decision-making? 
The last research question looked into the effect of the content of the issue on 
choice shift, group polarization and decision-making.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Decisions regarding risky issues would show a greater choice shift than 
intellectual or moral issues. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that decisions regarding risky issues would show a 
greater choice shift than intellectual or moral issues.  In this study, the two risk issues 
used were that of bird flu and drunk driving, while the two intellectual issues were 
those scenarios depicting the disease problem and game of chance.  The two moral 
issues were those of infidelity and pregnancy/abortion. MLM was run with choice 
shift as the dependent variable gender and story content and their interaction as the 
independent variables.   
The analysis showed that the interaction between story content and gender was 
significant, F (2, 795.005) = 3.770, p = .023. There was also a significant main effect 
of story content, F (2, 795.005) = 5.989, p = .003.  
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Table 10. 
Effect of Content on Choice Shift 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Story Content 2 795.005 5.989 .003 
Gender 1 65.751 .012 .914 
Story Content*Gender 2 795.005 3.770 .023 
 
Risk issues had a greater choice shift (M .676, SE = .389), than intellectual (M 
= -.615, SE = .237) or moral issues (M = .355, SE = .322).  However the mean 
difference was only significant between risk and intellectual issues (p = .003) and 
between moral and intellectual issues (p = .01).  There were no other main effects. 
Decomposition of the interaction effects showed that there was a significant 
difference F (1, 755.125) = 5.449, p = .02, between males and females when it came to 
intellectual issues with males (M = 1.131 SE = .375) making greater choice shifts than 
females (M = -.099, SE = .265).  In addition, for males, F (2, 795.005) = 6.648, p = 
.001 the mean difference was significant between the choice shifts for risk and 
intellectual issues (p = .009) as well as the choice shifts for moral and intellectual 
issues (p = .002). There was a greater shift for intellectual issues  (M = -1.131, SE = 
.375) than for risk issues (M = .758, SE = .631).  There was also a greater shift for 
intellectual issues than for moral issues (M = .848, SE = .519).  
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Table 11. 
Details of the Interaction Between Gender, Content and Choice Shift 
Story Content M SE F p 
     
Males 
Risk .758 .631 
Intellectual -1.131 .375 
Moral .848 .519 
3.770 .023 
     
Females 
Risk .594 .438 
Intellectual -.099 .179 
Moral -.138 .362 
3.770 .023 
  
The variance within groups was 18.605 (SE = .933) while the variance 
between groups was .215 (SE = .228) and resulting in an intraclass correlation of .006 
for variance between groups. This implies that there is a slight clustering effect as 
about 0.06% of the variance can be explained by group membership. The data 
therefore partially supports H5. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Decisions regarding risky issues would show a greater group 
polarization than intellectual or judgmental issues. 
The sixth hypothesis states that risky issues would show a greater group 
polarization than intellectual or moral issues.   Again a MLM was run, with group 
polarization as the dependent variable and gender and story content as the independent 
variables.  Results for this set of analysis showed that there was no interaction effect 
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gender F (2, 1494.985) = 1.455, p = .234, but there was a significant main effect for 
story content, F (2, 1497.125) = 7.062, p = .001.  There was no effect for gender F (1, 
133.654) = .771 p = .382. 
 
Table 12. 
Effect of Content on Group Polarization 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Story Content 2 1497.125 7.062 .001 
Gender 1 133.654 .771 .382 
Story Content*Gender 2 1494.985 1.455 .234 
 
The variance within groups was 10.285 (SE = .376) while the variance 
between groups was .162 (SE = .112) and the variance between members of the group 
was .083 (SE = .149), resulting in an intraclass correlation of .06 for variance between 
groups and an intraclass correlation of .08 for variance between members of the group. 
This implies that there is a slight clustering effect as about 9.1% of the variance can be 
explained by group mmbership. 
There was a greater group polarization for risk issues (M = .485, SE = .197), 
than for intellectual (M = -.264, SE = .126) and or moral issues (M = .166, SE = .165). 
Pairwise comparisons showed that there was a significant difference between the mean 
differences of risk and intellectual issues  (p = .000), as well as a significant difference 
between moral and intellectual issues (p = .020) but there was the difference between 
risk and moral issues was not significant (p = .183).  Thus H6 was partially supported. 
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Table 13. 
Details of the Effects of Story Content on Group Polarization 
Story Content M SE F p 
     
Risk .485 .197 
Intellectual  -.264 .126 
Moral .166 .165 
7.062 .001 
 
Hypothesis 7: Decisions regarding risky issues will show greater norm conformity. 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that decisions regarding risky issues would show a 
greater difference between the individual post-discussion decision and the group 
decision. MLM was run using gender and story type as the independent variables, 
prior attitude as the control covariate and norm conformity as the dependent variable.  
Results from the MLM showed that the interaction between story content and 
gender was not significant, F (2, 80.154) = 1.619, p = .199.   There was also no 
significant main effect of gender, F (1, 379.873) = 1.556, p = .213 or story content, F 
(2, 782.158) = 2.013, p = .134.  As there were no significant main or interaction 
effects, H7 was not supported. 
Table 14. 
Effect of Story Content on Norm Conformity  
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Story Content 2 782.158 2.013 .134 
Gender 1 379.873 1.336 .213 
Prior Attitude 1 96.355 6.640 .011 
Story Content*Gender 2 746 3.501 .199 
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 The variance within groups was 3.537 (SE = .179) while the variance between 
members of the group was .008 (SE = .037), resulting in an intraclass correlation of 
.002. This implies that there is a slight clustering effect as about 0.2% of the variance 
can be explained by group membership.  
The norm conformity for risk issues was (M = -.331, SE = .158), while that for 
intellectual issues was (M = .027, SE = .095) and the norm conformity for moral 
issues was (M = -0.56, SE = .130). However, pairwise comparisons showed that there 
was only a significant difference between the mean differences of risk and intellectual 
issues  (p = .045).  
 
Table 15. 
Details of the Effects of Story Content on Norm Conformity 
Story Content M SE F p 
     
Risk -.331 .158 
Intellectual  .027 .095 
Moral -.056 .130 
2.013 .134 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
FURTHER ANALYSIS 
 
As most of the analyses were not supported, further analyses were conducted 
to examine the data in greater detail.  There were 2 main areas that warranted further 
investigation: (a) Individual scenarios and (b) outliers.   
 
Individual Scenarios 
One reason that several of the hypotheses were not supported, might be due to 
the nature of the dependent variables.  Norm conformity, group polarization and 
choice shift were all composite variables in that each variable encompass the answers 
given for all the different issues.  E.g.: in hypothesis 1 which looked at the effect of 
individuating information on norm conformity.  Norm conformity was the difference 
between the individual’s decision after group discussion and the group’s decision 
across all the different issues.  As seen in research question 3, the content of the issue 
being considered—whether it be risk, moral or intellectual in nature—has an effect on 
these variables. In order to tease out the effects that each individual scenario might 
have on the variables, MLM was run on each of these scenarios on its own. 
To recap, the following table is a summary of the issues and the scenarios used 
for each issue.  Some of the issues, such as Infidelity, Disease Problem and Game of 
Chance had more than one scenario.  
 
 
 
 64 
Table 16. 
Summary of Issues and Scenarios Used 
Story 
Content 
Issue Scenario 
   
Disease Problem A: 
What is the lowest 
probability 
acceptable to choose 
Program A 
Disease Problem B: 
What is the lowest 
probability 
acceptable to choose 
Program B 
Disease Problem C: 
What is the lowest 
probability 
acceptable to choose 
Program C 
Intellectual Disease Problem: Imagine that the United 
States is preparing for the outbreak of an 
unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 
people. Four alternative programs to combat 
the disease have been proposed. Assume that 
the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows:  
 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be 
saved but the rest will die. If Program B is 
adopted, there is a one-third probability that 
600 people will be saved and a two-thirds 
probability that no people will be saved. If 
Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If 
Program D is adopted, there is a one-third 
probability that nobody will die and a two-
thirds probability that 600 people will die.  
 
 
Disease Problem D: 
What is the lowest 
probability 
acceptable to choose 
Program D 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
Game of Chance A: 
What is the lowest 
probability 
acceptable to choose 
option A over 
option B 
 
 Game of Chance 
Decision 1: Choose between the following: 
A) A sure gain of $240 
B) 25% chance to gain $1000 and 75% chance 
to gain nothing 
 
Decision 2: Choose between the following: 
C) A sure loss of $750 
D) 75% chance to lose $1000 and 25% chance 
to lose nothing 
 
Game of Chance B: 
What is the lowest 
probability 
acceptable C over 
option D 
 
Infidelity A: The 
probability of me 
confronting the 
male is … 
Moral Infidelity:  Two good friends of yours are 
getting married in a few weeks. They are a 
young couple and have been dating for three 
years.  One evening, while you are out dining, 
you notice the male across the room.  He is 
displaying very affectionate, unmistakable 
intimate behavior with another female.  What 
would you do?   
 
Infidelity B: The 
probability of me 
telling my female 
friend is … 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
 Pregnancy: Your sister has approached you 
with a serious predicament.  She is pregnant.  
She has been dating a young man for five 
months.  Since they are young, age 19, they 
have no plans on getting married.  She has not 
mentioned this to anyone.  Your parents are 
strict Catholics, and yet, she is considering an 
abortion.   
 
The probability of 
me trying to talk her 
out of the abortion 
is  
… 
Risk Bird Flu:  Bird flu has been confirmed in 
several parts of New York State but the CDC 
has yet to issue an alert.  It is in the middle of 
the semester and so classes and exams are still 
in session.  Failure to attend classes and the 
exams will result in a much lower GPA. 
However, you also know that bird flu is a 
highly contagious disease, which is often fatal 
when contracted.   
 
Please indicate the 
lowest probability 
that you would 
consider acceptable 
to make it 
worthwhile for you 
to go to classes and 
to take the exams. 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
Drunk Driving:  It is in the middle of winter 
and you are at a party and all your friends have 
already left.  It is 3am and you are really tired 
and all you want to do is to get home as fast as 
possible. You need to sleep as you have to get 
up early for a very important appointment.  
However, the party is located very far from all 
forms of public transportation and although you 
could walk home, it would take you more than 
an hour to walk home. An acquaintance that 
you have just met at the party offers you a ride 
home.  It is also clear that he has had way too 
much to drink and is in no condition to drive.  
Furthermore, the roads are very icy. 
Please state the 
lowest probability 
that you would 
consider acceptable 
to make it 
worthwhile for you 
to take up the offer 
of a ride. 
 
Risk 
  
 
This study examined the effect of risk, moral as well as intellectual content on 
decision-making and in each of these content areas, 2 issues were used.  For the 
intellectual content area, the issues used were of the disease problem and the game of 
chance.  For the moral content area, the issues used were that of infidelity and 
pregnancy.  Lastly, for the risk content area, the issues looked into were that of bird flu 
and drunk driving.  
The next step in the analysis was to test each issue and scenario separately to 
see if the variables—norm conformity, group polarization and choice shift—for each 
of these issues and scenarios differed.  There were a total of 11 scenarios. For each 
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scenario, MLM was used.  The first analysis used norm conformity as the dependent 
variable with gender, identity and prior attitude as the fixed effect variables. A second 
set of analysis was then run using group polarization as the dependent variable.  The 
analysis was run once more using choice shift as the dependent variable. A summary 
of the significant effects is shown in the following table: 
 
Table 17. 
Summary of Significant Effects 
Issue Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable 
Effect 
    
Drunk Driving Identity 
Gender 
Norm Conformity Interaction Effect 
Infidelity A Identity 
Gender 
Group 
Polarization 
Interaction Effect 
Infidelity B Gender Choice Shift Main Effect 
Infidelity B Gender Group 
Polarization 
Main Effect 
Game of Chance A Gender Norm Conformity Main Effect 
Game of Chance B Gender Norm Conformity Main Effect 
Game of Chance B Identity Group 
Polarization 
Main Effect 
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Outliers 
Another reason for the lack of support for the hypothesis was that the majority 
of the participants did not change their answers.  Upon examination of the frequency 
of the distribution of the variables norm conformity, group polarization and choice 
shift, it was found that the mode was often zero.  This might have been because of the 
homogeneity of the group, being as they were all college students, their answers to 
these issues were similar to each other, hence the lack of change.  However, the 
variance of these variables were quite often large, implying the existence of outliers or 
certain students who held more extreme views and who might have been more 
resistant to change and group influence.  The lack of significant results might have 
been due to the neutralization of the effect of these outliers by the majority that did not 
change.  Having the bulk of the participants centered on a mode of zero as well as the 
presence of outliers at both ends of the spectrum might have had the effect of 
canceling out and over-riding possible effects at the tail-end.   These outliers are of 
interest as it is important to know how individuating information and deliberation 
affect this group of people. 
To test the effects of individuating information and deliberation on these 
outliers, the frequency of the responses for each variable was first calculated. Those 
participants whose responses fell into the tail-ends (approximately 7.5% from each 
end) were selected from the initial dataset and were used as cases to be analyzed.   A 
mixed model analysis was then performed on this second dataset. A summary of the 
significant effects for the outliers is shown in the following table: 
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Table 18. 
Summary of Significant Effects for Outliers  
Issue Independent 
Variable  
Dependent 
Variable 
Effect 
    
Infidelity A Gender  
Identity 
Group 
Polarization 
Interaction Effect 
Infidelity B Gender  Group 
Polarization 
Main Effect 
Infidelity B Gender Choice Shift Main Effect 
Game of Chance A Gender Norm Conformity Main Effect 
Game of Chance A Gender Choice Shift Main Effect 
Game of Chance B Identity Norm Conformity Main Effect 
Game of Chance B Identity Group 
Polarization 
Main Effect 
Note. Game of Chance A showed a gender effect for choice shift when the 
analysis was run with the outliers.  No such effect was shown when the analysis was 
run with the entire data set. 
 
The following section lays out a detailed analysis of the findings reported 
above.  The significant overall findings for each scenario are reported first, followed 
by those pertaining to the outliers.  
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Drunk Driving 
Norm conformity – significant interaction effect. 
There was a significant interaction effect between gender and individuation 
information F (1, 63.302) = 4.444, p = .039. 
 
Table 19. 
Effect of Individuating Information (II) on Norm Conformity (Drunk Driving) 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 62.619 2.668 .107 
Individuating Information 1 26.821 .623 .437 
Prior Attitude 1 69.395 .722 .398 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 63.302 4.444 .039 
 
The variance within groups was 4.029 (SE = .842) while the variance between 
members of the group was .115 (SE = .547), resulting in an intraclass correlation of 
.028.  
Further analysis of the interaction effect indicated that there was a significant 
difference F (1, 62.732) = 7.946, p = .006 between males and females in the 
deindividuated condition with males (M = -1.678, SE = .548, df = 61.514) showing a 
greater amount of change than females (M = .225, SE = .414, df = 39.101). Males in 
the deindividuated condition therefore showed less norm conformity than females in 
the deindividuated condition. Compared to the group decision, deindividuated males 
adopted a riskier position while deindividuated females adopted a more cautious 
position.  No other comparisons were significant. 
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Table 20. 
Details of the Effects of Gender and Individuating Information (II) on Norm 
Conformity (Drunk Driving) 
Individuating Information M SE F p 
     
Males 
 Individuated -.191 .655 
 Deindividuated -1.678 .548 
4.444 .039 
     
Females 
Individuated -.431 .406 
Deindividuated .225 .414 
4.444 .039 
 
As the question asked for the lowest probability of NOT getting into an 
accident that was acceptable for a ride to be considered, the lower the number given, 
the riskier the participant’s choice would be, i.e. 0 = risky, 10 = cautious.  A negative 
number for norm conformity would indicate that the participant chose a riskier option 
than the group decision while a positive number for norm conformity would indicate 
that the participant chose a more cautious option as compared to the group decision.  
 A cross tabulation between the gender and norm conformity indicated that the 
most extreme responses were given by males and that it was males that made riskier 
decisions than females as well as riskier decisions than the group decision. Six 
participants made riskier decisions than the group decision and five out of the six 
participants were male.  The groups gave decisions of either nine or 10 on a scale of 
10.   For one participant (norm conformity = -10), the group gave a decision of 10 
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while the participant gave a decision of 0 after the group discussion while for another 
participant (norm conformity = -9), the group gave a nine while the participant gave a 
0. In most of the cases (norm conformity = +/- 1) the participants differed slightly 
from the group’s decision but their final responses were the same as their initial 
responses prior to the group discussion.  One participant (norm conformity = -3), gave 
a riskier response (6/10) than the group decision (9/10) but his decision after the group 
discussion was less risky as compared to his initial decision (4/10).  Another 
participant (norm conformity = -2) made a riskier decision than the group and his 
decision was riskier after the group discussion (7/10) than before the group discussion 
(8/10). 
 
 
Table 21. 
Cross Tabulation Between Gender and Norm Conformity for Drunk Driving 
Norm Conformity Male (n) Female (n) Total (n) 
    
-10 1 0 1 
-9 1 0 1 
-3 1 0 1 
-2 1 0 1 
-1 1 1 2 
0 7 17 24 
1 2 7 9 
Total 14 25 39 
Note. Positive numbers indicate a more cautious choice compared to the 
group’s decision while a negative number indicates a riskier choice chosen. 
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The analysis for the outliers failed to produce any significant effects.   
 
Infidelity A 
Group polarization – significant interaction effect. 
There was a significant interaction effect between gender and individuation 
information F (1, 146) = 8.732, p = .004. 
Table 22. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization (Infidelity A) 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 146 .290 .591 
Individuating Information 1 146 .198 .657 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 146 8.732 .004 
 
Further analysis of the interaction effect indicated that there was a significant 
difference between males and females in the deindividuated condition F (1, 146) = 
6.782, p = .01 with males (M = -.097, SE = .378, df = 146) showing a smaller amount 
of group polarization than females (M = 1.170, SE = .307, df = 146). This implies that 
females changed their pre and post-discussion opinions more than males did under 
deindividuation.  The question asked for the probability of confronting the man, with 
zero being that the participant would never confront the man and 10 being that the 
participant would definitely confront the man.  The dependent variable was group 
polarization, which looked at the difference between the participant’s decision after 
the discussion and the participant’s initial decision.  Therefore, compared to their pre-
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discussion decision deindividuated males changed their post-discussion decision in the 
direction of not confronting the man while deindividuated females changed their post-
discussion decision towards confronting the man. 
In addition, there was also a significant difference between males in the 
individuated and deindividuated conditions F (1, 146) = 4.425, p = .037 as well as a 
significant difference between females in the individuated and deindividuated 
conditions F (1, 146) = 4.539, p = .035.  For males, those in the individuated condition 
(M = 1.136, SE = .448, df = 146) showed more group polarization than those in the 
deindividuated condition (M = -.097, SE = .378, df = 146) while it was opposite for 
females with those in the individuated condition (M = .260, SE = .297, df = 146) 
showing less group polarization than those in the deindividuated condition (M = 1.170, 
SE = .307, df = 146).  This implies that compared to their pre-discussion decision, 
individuated males changed their opinions more after discussion than deindividuated 
males did, while deindividuated females changed their opinions more after the 
discussion than individuated females.  Also all groups, with the exception of 
deindividuated males became more confrontational, and the greatest change towards 
confrontation was found in deindividuated females.  
 
Table 23. 
Interaction Between Gender and Individuating Information on Group Polarization 
(Infidelity A) 
Individuating Information M SE F p 
Males 
Individuated 1.136 .448 
Deindividuated -.097 .378 
8.732 .004 
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Table 23 (Continued) 
Females 
Individuated .260 .297 
Deindividuated 1.170 .307 
8.732 .004 
 
Intraclass correlation failed to show significance. 
For males, almost as many of them in the deindividuated condition were less 
willing to confront the man after the discussion (n = 8) as there were males in the 
individuated condition who were more willing to confront the man after the discussion 
(n = 10). 
 
Table 24. 
Cross Tabulation Between Group Polarization (Infidelity A) and Individuating 
Information for Males 
    
Group Polarization Individuated (n) Deindividuated (n) Total (n) 
-7 0 1 1 
-6 0 1 1 
-3 0 2 2 
-2 1 2 3 
-1 0 2 2 
0 11 15 26 
1 1 5 6 
2 4 1 5 
3 3 0 3 
4 1 0 1 
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Table 24 (Continued) 
5 1 0 1 
7 0 1 1 
8 0 1 1 
Total 22 31 53 
Note. Positive numbers indicate that the participant is more likely to confront 
the man after the discussion while a negative number indicates that the participant is 
less likely to confront the man after discussion. 
 
For females, there were more of them in the deindividuated condition (n = 21) 
who were more willing to confront the man after a group discussion, while in the 
individuated condition, there were nine females who were less likely to confront the 
man after a group discussion as opposed to 16 females who were more likely to 
confront the man after a group discussion. 
 
 
Table 25. 
Cross Tabulation Between Group Polarization (Infidelity A) and Individuating 
Information for Females 
Group Polarization Individuated (n) Deindividuated (n) Total (n) 
    
-8 1 0 1 
-5 1 0 1 
-3 1 0 1 
-2 1 0 1 
-1 5 1 6 
0 25 25 50 
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Table 25 (Continued) 
1 5 7 12 
2 6 3 9 
3 3 5 8 
4 1 4 5 
5 0 1 1 
6 1 0 1 
7 0 1 1 
Total 50 57 97 
Note. Positive numbers indicate that the participant is more likely to confront the man 
after the discussion while a negative number indicates that the participant is less likely 
to confront the man after discussion. 
 
Outliers for Infidelity A – significant interaction effect for group polarization. 
An interaction effect was also found for the outliers. There was a significant 
interaction effect between gender and individuating information F (1, 19) = 5.288, p = 
.033.  
 
Table 26. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization (Infidelity A) - Outliers 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 19 .243 .628 
Individuating Information 1 19 .432 .519 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 19 5.288 .033 
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Further analysis of the interaction effect indicated that there was a significant 
difference between males and females in the deindividuated condition F (1, 19) = 
5.291, p = .033 with males (M = -1.000, SE = 1.613, df = 19) showing less group 
polarization than females (M = 4.667 SE = 1.862, df = 19). Males shifted towards 
non-confrontation while females shifted towards confrontation. In addition, there was 
also a significant difference between females in the individuated and deindividuated 
conditions F (1, 19) = 5.191, p = .034.   Those in the individuated condition (M = -
1.333, SE = 1.862, df = 19) showed less group polarization than those in the 
deindividuated condition (M = 4.667, SE = 1.862, df = 19).  Individuated females 
shifted towards non-confrontation while deindividuated females shifted towards 
confrontation. 
 
Table 27. 
Interaction Between Gender and Individuating Information on Group Polarization 
(Infidelity A) - Outliers 
Individuating Information M SE F p 
Males 
Individuated 2.333 2.634 
Deindividuated -1.000 1.862 
5.288 .033 
     
Females 
Individuated -1.333 1.613 
Deindividuated 4.667 1.862 
5.288 .033 
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More males shifted towards not confronting the man after the discussion (n = 
7) than confronting the man (n = 4).  For females, four females were more likely to 
confront the man after discussion while eight females were less likely to deal with a 
confrontation. 
 
Table 28. 
Cross tabulation between Group Polarization (Infidelity A) and Gender – Outliers 
Group Polarization Male (n) Female (n) Total (n) 
    
-8 0 1 1 
-7 1 0 1 
-6 1 0 1 
-5 0 1 1 
-3 2 1 3 
-2 3 1 4 
4 1 5 6 
5 1 1 2 
6 0 1 1 
7 1 1 2 
8 1 0 1 
Total 11 12 23 
Note. Positive numbers indicate that the participant is more likely to confront the man 
after the discussion while a negative number indicates that the participant is less likely 
to confront the man after discussion. 
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Females in the individuated condition appear to be less likely to confront the 
man after discussion (n = 5) while those in the deindividuated condition appear to be 
more likely to confront the man after discussion (n = 6). 
 
Table 29. 
Cross tabulation between Group Polarization (Infidelity A) and Identity in Females – 
Outliers 
Group Polarization Individuated (n) Deindividuated (n) Total (n) 
    
-8 1 0 1 
-5 1 0 1 
-3 1 0 1 
-2 1 0 1 
4 1 4 5 
5 0 1 1 
6 1 0 1 
7 0 1 1 
Total 6 6 12 
Note. Positive numbers indicate that the participant is more likely to confront the man 
after the discussion while a negative number indicates that the participant is less likely 
to confront the man after discussion. 
 
 82 
Infidelity B 
Choice shift – significant gender effect. 
There was a significant main effect of gender F (1, 72) = 22.525, p = .000.   
There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
 
Table 30. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Choice Shift (Infidelity B)  
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 72 22.525 .000 
Individuating Information 1 72 .701 .405 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 71 .071 .790 
 
Further analysis of the main effect indicated that males (M = 2.121, SE = .572, 
df = 72) made greater choice shifts than females (M = -1.171, SE = .391, df = 72). 
During the group decision, males changed to became more in favor of telling the 
woman while females grew less in favor of telling.  Though not significant, those 
groups in the individuated condition (M = .204, SE = .490, df = 72) changed less than 
those in the deindividuated condition (M = .746, SE = .458, df = 72).  
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Table 31. 
Details of the Effects of Gender on Choice Shift (Infidelity B) 
Gender M SE F p 
     
Male  2.121 .572 
Female -1.171 .458 
22.525 .000 
 
The analysis into intraclass correlation failed to reach significance. 
This scenario looked at the probability of telling the female friend about the 
cheating partner.  Zero indicated that there was no probability of telling the female 
friend and 10 indicated that the participant would definitely tell the female friend.  As 
choice shift was calculated by taking the difference between the group decision and 
the individual decision before group discussion, a positive number would indicate that 
the participant agreed to a group decision that showed a greater likelihood of telling 
the friend and a negative number would indicate that the participant agreed to a group 
decision that was less inclined towards telling the friend. 
The data indicates that there were more females who showed a choice shift in 
the direction of not telling the friend (n = 31) than there were females who showed a 
choice shift in the direction of telling the friend (n = 11). There were more males who 
shifted their decisions towards telling the friend (n = 15) than there were males who 
shifted towards not telling the friend (n = 3). 
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Table 32. 
Cross Tabulation Between Choice Shift (Infidelity B) and Gender 
Choice Shift Male (n) Female (n) Total (n) 
    
-5 1 7 8 
-4 0 5 5 
-3 0 6 6 
-2 1 2 3 
-1 1 11 12 
0 5 9 14 
1 3 4 7 
2 1 1 2 
3 4 4 8 
4 3 1 4 
5 3 0 3 
6 0 1 1 
7 1 0 1 
8 1 0 1 
Total 24 51 75 
Note. Positive numbers indicate that the participant agreed to a group decision that is 
more inclined towards telling the friend and a negative number would indicate that the 
participant agreed to a group decision that was less inclined towards telling the friend. 
 
Outlier responses for Infidelity B – significant gender effect for choice shift. 
There was a significant main effect of gender F (1, 20.811) = 34.06, p = .000.   
There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
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Table 33. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Choice Shift (Infidelity B) - Outliers 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 20.811 34.06 .000 
Individuating Information 1 11.329 3.741 .078 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 20.322 .619 .441 
 
Further analysis of the main effect indicated that males (M = 4.372, SE = 
1.202, df = 21.996) made greater choice shifts than females (M = -3.563, SE = .712, df 
= 13.746).   In the group decision, males became more willing to tell the woman while 
females became less willing to tell the woman.   
 
Table 34. 
Details of the Effects of Gender on Choice Shift (Infidelity B) - Outliers 
Gender M SE F p 
     
Male 4.372 1.202 
Female -3.563 .712 
34.06 .000 
 
The variance within groups was 7.047 (SE = 3.898) while the variance 
between members of the group was 1.771 (SE = 3.997), resulting in an intraclass 
correlation of 0.2.  
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Infidelity B 
Group polarization – significant gender effect. 
There was a significant main effect of gender F (1, 133.787) = 10.393, p = 
.002.   There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
 
Table 35. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization (Infidelity B) 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 133.787 10.393 .002 
Individuating Information 1 47.900 1.617 .210 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 134.96 .071 .400 
 
Further analysis of the main effect indicated that males (M = .722, SE = .273, 
df = 125.342) showed greater group polarization than females (M = -.316, SE = .209, 
df = 78.688).  Compared to the pre-discussion decision, males were more willing after 
the discussion to tell the woman what they saw, while females became less willing to 
tell the woman after the discussion. 
Though not significant, those groups in the individuated condition (M = -.02, 
SE = .260, df = 52.136) changed less than those in the deindividuated condition (M = 
.427, SE = .245, df = 48.788). 
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Table 36. 
Details of the Effects of Gender on Choice Shift (Infidelity B) - Outliers 
Gender M SE F p 
     
Male .722 .273 
Female -.316 .209 
10.393 .002 
 
The variance within groups was 3.282 (SE = .467) while the variance between 
members of the group was .44 (SE = .353), resulting in an intraclass correlation of 
.118.  
Group polarization was obtained by taking the difference between individual’s 
decision after discussion and the individual’s decision before discussion.  As such, in 
this scenario, a negative number would indicate that the individual was more inclined 
to tell the friend before the discussion than after the discussion.  A positive number 
would mean that the individual was more inclined to tell the friend after the discussion 
as opposed to before the discussion. 
The data indicates that 27 females were more inclined to tell their friend about 
what they saw after the group discussion than they were before the discussion while 
24 females were less inclined to tell their friends after the discussion.  For males, 7 
males were more inclined to tell and 21 males were less inclined to tell. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88 
Table 37. 
Cross Tabulation Between Group Polarization (Infidelity B) and Gender 
Group Polarization Male (n) Female (n) Total (n) 
    
-8 0 1 1 
-7 1 0 1 
-5 0 1 1 
-4 1 3 4 
-3 0 6 6 
-2 2 6 8 
-1 4 10 14 
0 24 46 70 
1 6 17 23 
2 5 3 8 
3 6  3 9 
4 0 1 1 
5 2 0 2 
6 1 0 1 
7 1 0 1 
Total 53 97 150 
Note. Positive numbers indicate that the participant was more inclined to tell the friend 
after the discussion as opposed to before the discussion and a negative number would 
indicate that the participant was more inclined to tell the friend before the discussion. 
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Outlier responses for Infidelity B – significant gender effect for group  
polarization. 
There was a significant main effect of gender F (1, 7.827) = 16.398, p = .004.   
There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
 
Table 38. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization (Infidelity B) - Outliers 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 7.827 16.398 .004 
Individuating Information 1 21.065 .765 .392 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 22.879 .086 .772 
 
Further analysis of the main effect indicated that males (M = 2.228, SE = 
1.022, df = 7.8277) showed greater group polarization than females (M = -2.104, SE = 
.957, df = 7.827).  Again, compared to the pre-discussion decision, males were more 
willing to tell the woman what they saw, while females were less willing to tell the 
woman what they saw. 
 
Table 39. 
Details of the Effects of Gender on Group Polarization (Infidelity B) - Outliers 
Gender M SE F p 
     
Male 2.228 1.022 
Female -2.104 .957 
16.398 .004 
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The variance within groups was 2.131 (SE = 1.672) while the variance 
between members of the group was 13.152 (SE = 4.989), resulting in an intraclass 
correlation of .861. 
 
Game of Chance A 
Norm conformity – significant gender effect. 
There was a significant main effect of gender F (1, 57.909) = 6.408, p = .014.   
There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
 
Table 40. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity (Game of Chance A)  
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 57.909 6.408 .014 
Individuating Information 1 19.381 .041 .842 
Prior Attitude 1 70.322 21.433 .000 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 54.946 .054 .816 
 
Further analysis of the main effect indicated that males (M = -.555, SE = .374, 
df = 59.809) made greater changes than females (M = .499, SE = .278, df = 29.839).  
This meant that males diverged more from the group decision than females in their 
post-discussion decision, implying that males conformed less than females. Though 
not significant, those groups in the individuated condition (M = .022 SE = .366, df = 
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21.630) changed less than those in the deindividuated condition (M = -.077, SE = 
.343, df = 20.048). 
 
Table 41. 
Details of the Effects of Gender on Norm Conformity (Game of Chance A)  
Gender M SE F p 
     
Male -.555 .374 
Female .499 .278 
6.408 .014 
  
The variance within groups was 2.545 (SE = .541) while the variance between 
members of the group was .637 (SE = .536), resulting in an intraclass correlation of 
.20.  
 
Outlier responses for Game of Chance A – significant gender effect for norm  
conformity. 
There was a significant main effect of gender F (1, 15.218) = 5.880, p = .028.   
There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
 
Table 42. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity (Game of Chance A) - 
Outliers 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 15.218 5.880 .028 
Individuating Information 1 11.668 .331 .576 
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Table 42 (Continued) 
Prior Attitude 
 
1 
 
14.096 
 
.331 
 
.576 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 11.394 1.457 .252 
 
Further analysis of the main effect indicated that males (M = -2.561, SE = 
1.133, df = 16.953) made greater changes than females (M = .733, SE = .857, df = 
14.444). This meant that males diverged more from the group decision than females in 
their post-discussion decision, implying that males conformed less than females. 
 
Table 43. 
Details of the Effects of Gender on Norm Conformity (Game of Chance A) - Outliers 
Gender M SE F p 
     
Male -2.561 1.133 
Female .733 .857 
5.880 .028 
 
The variance within groups was 3.797 (SE = 2.45) while the variance between 
members of the group was 4.402 (SE = 3.626), resulting in an intraclass correlation of 
.537.  
 
Outlier responses for Game of Chance A – significant gender effect for choice  
shift. 
A significant effect for gender F (1, 14.484) = 4.659, p = .048 was only found 
when the analysis was run on the outliers. There were no other significant main or 
interaction effects.  
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Table 44. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Choice Shift (Game of Chance A) - Outliers 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 14.482 4.659 .048 
Individuating Information 1 7.7175 .012 .915 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 12.292 .054 .820 
 
Further analysis of the main effect indicated that males (M = 2.920, SE = 
1.702, df = 13.007) made greater choice shifts than females (M = -1.530, SE = -1.530, 
df = 10.683).  
 
Table 45. 
Details of the Effects of Gender on Choice Shift (Game of Chance A)  
Gender M SE F p 
     
Male 2.920 1.702 
Female -1.530 1.416 
4.659 .048 
 
The variance within groups was 14.355 (SE = 8.405) while the variance 
between members of the group was 5.044 (SE = 9.531), resulting in an intraclass 
correlation of .26.  
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Game of Chance B 
Norm conformity – significant effect for individuating information. 
There was a significant main effect of individuating information F (1, 22.755) 
= 5.322, p = .031.   There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
 
Table 46. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity (Game of Chance B)  
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 59.164 .001 .970 
Individuating Information 1 22.755 5.322 .031 
Prior Attitude 1 63.323 .495 .484 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 58.898 .004 .947 
 
Further analysis of the main effect indicated that those in the individuated 
condition (M = .788, SE = .388, df = 25.482) made greater changes than those in the 
deindividuated condition (M = -.414, SE = .365, df = 23.734).  
 
Table 47. 
Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity (Game of 
Chance B) 
Individuating Information M SE F p 
     
Individuated .788 .388 5.322 .031 
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Table 47 (Continued) 
Deindividuated 
 
-.414 
 
.365 
  
 
The variance within groups was 3.038 (SE = .620) while the variance between 
members of the group was .670 (SE = .544), resulting in an intraclass correlation of 
.181.  
 
Outlier responses for Game of Chance B – significant effect for individuating 
information on norm conformity. 
There was a significant main effect of individuating information F (1, 9.711) = 
5.924, p = .036.   There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
 
Table 48. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity (Game of Chance B) - 
Outliers 
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 11.352 .182 .678 
Individuating Information 1 9.711 5.924 .036 
Prior Attitude 1 7.813 .394 .548 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 13.712 2.732 .121 
 
Further analysis of the main effect indicated that that those in the individuated 
condition (M = 2.245, SE = 1.036, df = 8.657) made greater changes than those in the 
deindividuated condition (M = -1.660, SE = 1.240, df = 11.041).  
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Table 49. 
Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on Norm Conformity (Game of 
Chance B) - Outliers 
Individuating Information M SE F p 
     
Individuated 2.245 1.036 
Deindividuated -1.660 1.240 
5.924 .036 
 
The variance within groups was 8.626 (SE = 5.596) while the variance 
between members of the group was 2.371 (SE = 5.541), resulting in an intraclass 
correlation of .216. 
 
Game of Chance B 
Group polarization – significant effect for individuating information. 
There was a significant main effect of individuating information F (1, 147) = 
5.678, p = .018.   There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
Table 50. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization (Game of Chance B)  
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 147 .098 .213 
Individuating Information 1 147 5.678 .018 
Gender* Individuating 
Information 
1 147 .650 .421 
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Further analysis of the main effect indicated that those in the individuated 
condition (M = .236, SE = .326, df = 147) had smaller group polarization than those in 
the deindividuated condition (M = -.806, SE = .305, df = 147). 
 
Table 51. 
Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on Group Polarization (Game of 
Chance B)  
Individuating Information M SE F p 
     
Individuated .236 .326 
Deindividuated -.806 .305 
5.678 .018 
 
Intraclass correlation failed to reach significance. 
 
Outlier responses for Game of Chance B – significant effect of individuating   
information for group polarization. 
There was a significant main effect of individuating information F (1, 15) = 
7.695, p = .014.   There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
 
Table 52. 
Effect of Individuating Information on Group Polarization (Game of Chance B)  
Independent Variables Num df Denom df F p 
     
Gender 1 15 .015 .903 
Individuating Information 1 15 7.695 .014 
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Further analysis of the main effect indicated that those in the individuated 
condition (M = 2.906, SE = 2.262, df = 15) made had smaller group polarization than 
those in the deindividuated condition (M = -5.3, SE = 1.907, df = 15).  
 
Table 53. 
Details of the Effects of Individuating Information on Group Polarization (Game of 
Chance B) - Outliers 
Individuating Information M SE F p 
     
Individuated 2.906 2.262 
Deindividuated -5.300 1.907 
7.695 .014 
 
Intraclass correlation failed to reach significance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study focused on online decision-making and examined whether 
normative influence is a factor in online opinion change.  In doing so it also looked at 
the effects of group identity as well as the effects of content on group and individual 
decision-making.  In particular, the purpose of this research was to find out (a) the 
effect of normative influence on individual and group decision-making; (b) the effect 
of consensus on individual decision-making and; (c) if the nature of the issue being 
decided had an effect on group and individual decision-making.  
 
How is This Study Different? 
An important area in which this study differs from previous studies is the way 
that the online conversations were conducted. The conversations were not controlled 
and the participants were allowed to discuss the issues freely. Some studies, for 
example those by Lee and Nass (2002)  as well as those by Lee (2006; 2007) have 
involved the use of computer-simulated conversations whereby the participants were 
presented with pre-programmed responses instead of conversing with actual 
participants. In such settings, the “conversations” consisted of pre-programmed 
answers and justifications for these answers and did not allow for any questions or 
clarifications.  In the current study, participants interacted with other participants 
instead of a computer.  Allowing for a free-flowing conversation more closely 
approximates a natural conversation similar to what would take place on a bulletin 
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board or a chat room as opposed to a laboratory-induced conversation.  It examined 
group interaction in a realistic setting. 
A second difference was the lack of a group norm.  Research on decision-
making in CMC has often employed the imposition of a group norm.  In other studies, 
such as that of Spears, Lee and Lea (1990), the group norm was imposed and did not 
grow out of intragroup interaction.  Rather prior to the group discussion, participants 
were presented with survey data ostensibly collected from their peers, which favored 
one position on a controversial issue, and polarization was defined as the extent to 
which post-discussion attitudes moved towards this pre-established norm.  Another 
alternative in which the group norm is given is through the use of computer-simulated 
responses. In some experiments, participants are told that they would be interacting 
with other university students.  In actuality, a computer program would supply the 
responses.  Lee and Nass (2002) conducted an experiment in which the computer 
program provided all the responses but it appeared to the participant that several other 
people were participating as well.  The other “participants” always gave their answers 
first and the participant always went last.  In other experiments, the participant would 
give an answer and the computer program would provide answers for “participants” 
who either unanimously supported or opposed the answer (Lee, 2006, 2007)  In this 
way, the pressure to conform was manipulated. In this study, no such norm is imposed 
upon the group and the group norm was left to arise spontaneously out of the group 
discussion.  
This study also attempted to replicate the original choice shift methodology in 
which the participants were asked for their individual opinions before and after the 
discussion. In other studies, participants saw the scenarios online and proceeded to 
give their answers online and then again privately after the discussion’s conclusion.  
Attitude change, or group polarization was thus measured as the difference between 
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the norm and the individual decision after discussion (Lee, 2006, 2007; Lee & Nass, 
2002).  However, this definition of group polarization differs from that employed by 
the original choice shift studies. This study thus measures not only this difference 
between the norm and the post-discussion decision, which was termed here as norm 
conformity, it also attempted to measure the difference between the individual’s 
decision before and after the discussion (group polarization) as well as the difference 
between the pre-discussion difference and the group decision (choice shift) as defined 
in the original literature.  
Last but not least, this study also differs from previous CMC studies in that it 
required half of the groups to come to a unanimous decision in order to examine the 
effects of consensus on decision-making.  Past studies did not ask the group to come 
to a consensus.  Instead they normally required the group to either just participate in a 
discussion or come to a majority decision.  
 
Effect of Normative Influence on Decision-Making 
Research question 1 examined the effects of normative influence on decision-
making. From the analyses in hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, it appears that normative 
influence does not seem to affect norm conformity, group polarization or choice shift. 
The data did not support the first three hypotheses as there was no significant 
difference between the decisions made by those in the individuated groups and those 
in the deindividuated groups. As such, this implies that normative influence does not 
affect decision-making. As the hypotheses were not supported, it might be that 
informational influence and persuasive arguments that were in operation rather 
normative influence.  However, there might be other explanations as to why the 
hypotheses were not supported. 
 102 
One reason for the lack of significant findings in the first three hypotheses is 
due to the nature of the dependent variables. In these three hypotheses, these 
dependent variables were composite variables.  That is, each variable was constructed 
by adding up the corresponding variables across all eleven scenarios.  As shown in 
hypotheses five and six, the content of the issue has an effect on these variables.  
Therefore, by constructing the composite variables, the first three hypotheses failed to 
take into account the effect of content.  When the analyses was run on each of the 
scenarios separately, it was shown that normative influence was working in some of 
the scenarios (drunk driving and infidelity) but not in others.  Hence the use of 
composite variables was not appropriate.  
Another explanation for the inability to find the normally highly consistent 
phenomenon of group polarization could be a temporal one. Previous SIDE studies 
have failed to factor in the social effects component of communication. With such 
short timeframes to work in, it would have been difficult to complete the task 
objectives, let alone think about relational concerns.  In this study, the chat sessions 
lasted between 45 to 75 minutes per session.   In comparison, most studies that looked 
at online opinion change had the groups interacting for much shorter periods of time. 
Having an online chat session for only a short time frame does not allow for much 
social information to be exchanged. Furthermore, in some studies (e.g.: Lee, 2006, 
2007), the conversation consisted of an exchange of answers and their justifications, 
without the possibility for questions or clarifications.  It was unlikely that much social 
information processing would have been going on in such situations.  
In the present study, with the amount of time expended in each conversation 
extending to 45 minutes or more, much more information can be exchanged and 
participants can get to form distinct impressions of each other as individuals. A 
lengthened timeframe might have diluted the effect of the individuating information 
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and hence resulted in the lack of significant findings despite the study manipulating 
individuating information in a manner similar to that of previous studies. In this study, 
the participants had to justify their answers and even though they were anonymous, 
participants could have attributed certain characteristics to each other as a result of the 
answers and justifications given.   In the course having to go through eleven scenarios, 
impressions could have been formed that individuated the participants. Therefore there 
is the possibility that due to the longer time frame, individuation could be happening 
even in the deindividuated groups as participants interacted and got to know each 
other better. 
Taylor and MacDonald (2002) found a temporal difference in group 
polarization.  In a replication of Spears, Lea and Lee (1990) study in which 
identifiability (high/low) and group salience (high/low) were manipulated, they found 
the predicted effects occurred at the beginning and middle of the interaction but not at 
the final post-discussion stage of the interaction.  McGrath and Hollingshead (1993) 
arrived at a similar conclusion in their work which emphasizes the importance of intra-
group dynamics and temporal issues in computer-supported groups.  They suggested 
that it was normally during the early stages of group development that group members 
tried to establish and understand the norms of the group, and to obtain a basis of 
influence over the decision process.  CMC may therefore have significant effects on 
groups at the early stage of group development because it permits members to focus 
more rapidly and intensely on the task itself.   The results here suggest that opinion 
polarization in CMC may not be as widespread a phenomenon as previously 
suggested.  
This temporal explanation would fit well with Walther’s (1992; 1996) Social 
Information Processing (SIP) Theory, which highlights the fact that social information 
is still being exchanged in CMC but at a slower pace than what would normally occur 
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in FTF communication. SIP assumes that communicators in CMC are driven to 
develop social relationships. This results in the accumulation of interpersonal 
information about other participants and develops relational communication among 
them. SIP thus posits that CMC is similar to other forms in communication in that its 
participants still take part in relational communication. They sought to minimize 
uncertainties, form impressions and develop affinities. Research has also shown that 
very little motivation or identity issues need be salient in order for communicators to 
adapt their relational behaviors effectively across channels (Walther, Loh, & Granka, 
2005).  SIP argues that impressions and relational communication improve in CMC 
parallel to that in FTF communication over time, precisely due to the development of 
personal knowledge structures of one’s partners (Walther, 1992). 
 
Effect of Consensus on Decision-Making 
Although the pairwise comparisons showed that participants who had to come 
to a decision showed greater polarization than those in the discussion condition, 
however the results failed to reach significance and therefore the hypothesis was not 
supported. Hence the data suggests that having to come to a group decision did not 
influence opinion change. 
It is unclear at the points as to why the need to come to a decision did not 
affect norm conformity, choice shifts and group polarization.  One explanation might 
be that the issues presented were not personally relevant to the participants, and as 
such cognitive processing was peripheral in nature (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 
1981; Petty, Priester, & Brinol, 2002).  Less thoughtful message processing might 
have lead to a greater reliance on normative considerations in both decision and 
discussion conditions.  It might have been just easier for the participants to “go with 
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the flow” and to cognitively take path of least resistance, rather than to think through 
the arguments presented to come up with their own post-discussion decisions. 
 
Effect of Story Content/Issue Type 
The data indicated that the content—risk, moral or intellectual—of the issue 
under consideration had an effect on choice shift and group polarization but not on 
norm conformity.  Choice shifts were greater for risk issues than for intellectual or 
moral issues.  However, the difference between risk and moral issues was not 
significant. Thus, the participants’ group decision shifted most from their original 
decision when it came to risk issues.  However, rather than a shift in the direction of 
being more risky, results indicated that the participants endorsed a group decision that 
was more cautious than their own initial decision. For moral issues, they endorsed a 
group decision that was more confrontational than their own.  An interaction effect 
between gender and content was also observed, with males making a greater choice 
shift than females in intellectual issues and males making a greater shift in intellectual 
issues than in moral or risk issues.  
For group polarization, there was a greater group polarization for risk issues, 
than for intellectual or moral issues. The data showed that in the risk issues, the 
participants became more cautious after the group discussion than before the group 
discussion while for the moral issues, the participants became more confrontational 
after the group discussion than before the group discussion. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that there was a significant difference between the mean differences of risk 
and intellectual issues, as well as a significant difference between moral and 
intellectual issues but the difference between risk and moral issues was not significant.   
As for norm conformity, although story content failed to reach significance however, 
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pairwise comparison found a significant difference between the mean difference for 
risk and intellectual issues.  
This research has shown support for the assertion that content of the issue 
under discussion affects the changes in decision-making and it suggests that there is a 
difference between the way that people respond to risk, intellectual and moral issues. 
People respond differently to risk and moral issues as opposed to intellectual issues 
and this nicely illustrates the point made by Epstein (1994) that people understand 
reality via the analytic as well as the intuitive ways, and that we utilize both an 
analytic system and a experiential system when we make decisions (Slovic et al., 
2004). 
Since there were no significant differences between risk and moral issues, it 
suggests that risk and moral issues are qualitatively different from intellectual issues, 
but perhaps not from each other.  This would lend support to the proposition that the 
issues on which groups make decisions lie along a continuum, with intellectual issues 
being on one end of the continuum and moral/judgmental issues being on the other 
end (Laughlin, 1980; Laughlin & Earley, 1982).   The data seem to indicate that risk 
might belong on the same end of the spectrum as moral issues whereby instead of a 
correct answer, risk issues involve behavioral, ethical or aesthetic judgments for which 
there are no demonstrably correct answers.  In risk issues, similar to moral issues, the 
right answer is achieved by reaching consensus.  
One unexpected finding was that of the effect of gender.  When testing the 
effect of content on choice shifts, there was an interaction effect between gender and 
content, with males making a greater choice shift than females in intellectual issues 
and males making a greater shift in intellectual issues than in moral or risk issues. An 
analysis of the intellectual issues showed that this change occurred mainly in the 
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outliers.  Intellectual issues having a demonstrably correct answer would make it is 
easier to convince people to change their minds once the right answer is shown.   
  
Effect of Individual Scenarios 
Not only does norm conformity, choice shift and group polarization have 
different effects depending on the story content, the different scenarios affect choice 
shift, group polarization and norm conformity differently.  For risk issues, the only 
significant effect was for drunk driving which had that an interaction effect on norm 
conformity.  For moral issues, there was interaction effect for group polarization on 
Infidelity A and gender effect for choice shifts and group polarization on Infidelity B.  
For intellectual issues, there was a gender effect for norm conformity on Game of 
Chance A and an individuating information effect for norm conformity and group 
polarization for Game of Chance B. 
In the risk issue of drunk driving, deindividuation affects males and females 
differently, with males showing less conformity than females.  Instead they moved and 
away from the group decision in the direction of risk while females moved in the 
direction of caution. This is in line with the literature in which women are more 
susceptible to group pressure and conform more than men do in group decision-
making (Eagly, 1983).  It is of interest that males and females moved in opposite 
directions when deindividuated. 
For moral issues, individuating information affects males and females 
differently. Individuating information elicits opposite reactions from males and 
females. Deindividuated females changed their pre and post-discussion opinions more 
than individuated females did and individuated males changed their pre and post-
discussion opinions more than deindividuated males did.  It appears that 
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deindividuation affects attitude change in females, making them conform more to the 
group norm.  When deindividuated, females showed greater change between the pre 
and post-discussion opinions than males, with females changing towards confrontation 
and males towards non-confrontation.  All groups with the exception of 
deindividuated males, showed a movement towards confrontation with the greatest 
change towards confrontation being in deindividuated females.  Therefore it seems 
like for moral issues, individuating information has an effect on both males and 
females, but in opposite directions.  However, when it came to speaking out to their 
friend, only gender made a difference.  Males showed greater change between their 
own decision and the group decision and between their pre and post-discussion 
decisions.  Males became more willing to speak out but females became less willing to 
do so.  
For intellectual issues, in Game of Chance A, males conformed less than 
females.  However, when it came to the outliers, males showed greater choice shift 
than females, which meant that when it came to the group decision, males changed 
more to conform to the group decision, while females changed less. For Game of 
Chance B, individuating information had an effect, with participants in the 
individuated condition conforming less than those in the deindividuated condition.  
The same result was found for the outliers.  In addition, deindividuated participants 
showed greater group polarization than individuated participants. The same result was 
found for the outliers.  
Therefore not only does the content of the discussion have an effect on 
decision-making, but the individual’s gender also affected the responses gives.  
Deindividuation appears to affect females in that it makes them more susceptible to 
group influence.  
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Implications and Future Research 
This study has examined how normative influence and content has affected 
decision-making.  By looking at the various aspects of decision-making such as choice 
shift, group polarization and norm conformity, it has enriched the literature by 
adapting the traditional choice shift research to a new medium, and by examining 
whether and in what ways group and individual identities affect decision-making.   
One finding of this study is that the content being discussed affects decision-
making and opinion change.  People react to risk and moral issues much differently 
than they do to intellectual issues.  Hence the nature of the task should be considered 
in group polarization research.   This has implications for the online groups, especially 
social support groups and advocacy groups as the nature of their discussions would 
revolve around risk and moral issues as opposed to intellectual issues.   Although this 
study examined the risk, moral and intellectual issues, however the scenario 
concerning bird flu, which was a risk issue and the scenario concerning 
pregnancy/abortion which was a moral issue did not produce any significant effects.  
One reason could be that the participants were all college students and hence they 
were better able to relate to issues such as drunk driving and relationship problems.  
This is a problem with most choice-shift research, which ask for solutions to third-
person hypothetical situations that are often difficult for the college-aged participants 
to relate to.  Future research should replicate the study with other scenarios that are 
more applicable to the participants.   
Another finding, albeit an expected one is that of the effect of gender. Previous 
studies that have taken gender into consideration have looked at group satisfaction and 
gender (Savicki, Kelly, & Lingenfelter, 1996),   gender perceptions and expectations 
(Matheson, 1991), gender communication styles (Duran & Carveth, 1990) and gender 
stereotyping (Nass and Moon, 2000; Reeves and Nass, 1996). However, most online 
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choice shift studies do not examine gender specifically.  Gender should thus be taken 
into consideration in future studies as males and females react differently to both 
content and the amount of individuating information.  That males and females react in 
opposite directions especially under deindividuation has implications for online social 
support groups. Social support groups that cater to women need to be aware of the 
possibility that their participants might be susceptible to the effect of group influence 
and norm conformity.  
This study also pointed out a problem with the SIDE mode.  Past SIDE 
research has often overlooked the possible effect of time on the group discussion. The 
longer time frame for group discussion as provided in this study might have allowed 
individuation to occur, even in the deindividuated groups. SIDE might have been able 
to provide an explanation for the group processes that occur in the earlier stages of 
CMC interaction but it does not hold true when group members start to get to know 
better, regardless of their state of individuation.  Further research needs to focus on 
those changes in attitude, which occur at the beginning of the discussion instead of just 
collecting measurements of attitude before and after the discussion as is the case in 
most polarization research.  Although anonymity and deindividuation do occur in 
online bulletin boards and chat rooms, it is more likely than not that individuals are 
not as completely deindividuated as the participants are in SIDE experiments.   
The desire for a more naturalistic setting for the group setting unfortunately led 
to several limitations in this study. One limitation was that the group norm was left to 
develop on its own unlike previous studies in which the group norm was explicitly 
given or manipulated.  There was therefore less control over the interaction and as a 
result a strong or unified group norm might not have emerged.  This study did not 
measure the strength of the perceived group norm and this is one area that future 
research might want to explore further.  
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A more naturalistic setting also resulted in the inability to control for the 
amount or diversity of informational influence.  Although all participants were 
provided with the same scenarios, which contained the same information, but due to 
the naturalistic condition, there was no control for what additional information that the 
participants brought in to the conversation.  A possible control of this in future 
experiments would be the use of confederates which would help regulate the 
conversation yet at the same time allow for greater spontaneity than pre-programmed 
computer-generated responses 
There was also a lack of opposing views and heterogeneity in the initial 
position.  Opinion change would logically occur only in the face of opposing views 
and this lack of opposing views and heterogeneity might have hampered any 
measurement of change. According to Singleton (1979), the direction of the shift 
depends upon the distribution of initial choices in the total population. A divergence of 
views is a prerequisite for “deviant” responses whose movement toward an implicit 
group norm, according to conformity theory, results in “group-induced” shifts. Group 
heterogeneity appears to be a necessary condition for choice shifts and for the 
initiation of group processes that evoke the shifts.  The data showed that the mode for 
norm conformity, group polarization and choice shifts was often zero, implying a lack 
of opinion change.  Most of the participants had moderate opinions towards the issues 
presented and the range of shift was therefore relatively restricted.  
Yet another possibility was that the participant’s initial decision was the 
product of predeliberation normative influence.  According to Henningsen and 
Henningsen (2004), if the preferences of other group members are not know, people 
have the tendency to endorse moderate positions in their initial decisions so as to 
allow for flexibility and to appear open-minded.  This is especially so when they 
anticipate participating in a group discussion. 
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Another variable that might have contaminated the results was the extremity of 
the some of the participants’ initial preference. Lee (2008) suggests that for those 
participants who hold extreme opinions, this extremity of opinion might reflect how 
confident the participant was about his or her own decision.  In such a case, those 
holding more extreme opinions would have been less likely to change their 
preferences due to greater self-confidence.   
This study has contributed to the understanding of how content and gender 
affect group decision-making in CMC. In addition, this research hoped to have 
advanced current understanding of the impact of group identification on the decision-
making process. Further research needs to explore other factors that affect online 
group decision-making such as temporal factors and the social and psychological 
processes that are activated when different types of content, in particular risk content 
is being discussed.  This research highlights the fact that perhaps some group 
processes, such as group polarization occur differently in naturalistic computer-
mediated group setting what has been shown previously in the literature.  
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APPENDIX 1 
CHOICE DILEMMA QUESIONNAIRE 
 
 
Case #: _________________ 
 
 
Instructions: 
 
On the following pages, you will find a series of situations.  In each situation, you will 
be asked to indicate the probabilities (0 to 100%) that you are willing to take. 
 
Read each situation carefully before giving your judgment.  There are 6 situations in 
total. Please do not omit any of them. 
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BIRD FLU 
 
Bird flu has been confirmed in several parts of New York State but the CDC has yet to 
issue an alert.  It is in the middle of the semester and so classes and exams are still in 
session.  Failure to attend classes and the exams will result in a much lower GPA. 
However, you also know that bird flu is a highly contagious disease which is often 
fatal when contracted.   
 
Please indicate the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable to make it 
worthwhile for you to go to classes and to take the exams. 
 
_______ I will NOT go to classes and take the exams if there was 0% chance that I 
will contract the disease. 
_______ I will NOT go to classes and take the exams if there was 10% chance that I 
will contract the disease. 
_______ I will NOT go to classes and take the exams if there was 20% chance that I 
will contract the disease. 
_______ I will NOT go to classes and take the exams if there was 30% chance that I 
will contract the disease. 
_______ I will NOT go to classes and take the exams if there was 40% chance that I 
will contract the disease. 
_______ I will NOT go to classes and take the exams if there was 50% chance that I 
will contract the disease. 
_______ I will NOT go to classes and take the exams if there was 60% chance that I 
will contract the disease. 
_______ I will NOT go to classes and take the exams if there was 70% chance that I 
will contract the disease. 
_______ I will NOT go to classes and take the exams if there was 80% chance that I 
will contract the disease. 
_______ I will NOT go to classes and take the exams if there was 90% chance that I 
will contract the disease. 
_______ I will NOT go to classes and take the exams if there was 100% chance that I 
will contract the disease. 
 
 
What decision do you think that the majority of people like yourself would make? 
_______ % 
 
********************************************************************* 
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DRUNK DRIVING 
 
It is in the middle of winter and you are at a party and all your friends have already 
left.  It is 3am and you are really tired and all you want to do is to get home as fast as 
possible. You need to sleep as you have to get up early for a very important 
appointment.  However, the party is located very far from all forms of public 
transportation and although you could walk home, it would take you more than an 
hour to walk home. An acquaintance that you have just met at the party offers you a 
ride home.  It is also clear that he has had way too much to drink and is in no condition 
to drive.  Furthermore, the roads are very icy. 
 
Please state the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable to make it 
worthwhile for you to take up the offer of a ride. 
 
_______ I will take the ride if there was 0% chance of NOT getting into an accident. 
_______ I will take the ride if there was 10% chance of NOT getting into an accident. 
_______ I will take the ride if there was 20% chance of NOT getting into an accident. 
_______ I will take the ride if there was 30% chance of NOT getting into an accident. 
_______ I will take the ride if there was 40% chance of NOT getting into an accident. 
_______ I will take the ride if there was 50% chance of NOT getting into an accident. 
_______ I will take the ride if there was 60% chance of NOT getting into an accident. 
_______ I will take the ride if there was 70% chance of NOT getting into an accident. 
_______ I will take the ride if there was 80% chance of NOT getting into an accident. 
_______ I will take the ride if there was 90% chance of NOT getting into an accident. 
_______ I will take the ride if there was 100% chance of NOT getting into an 
accident. 
 
What decision do you think that the majority of people like yourself would make? 
_______ % 
 
 
********************************************************************* 
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PREGNANCY 
 
Your sister has approached you with a serious predicament.  She is pregnant.  She has 
been dating a young man for five months.  Since they are young, age 19, they have no 
plans on getting married.  She has not mentioned this to anyone.  Your parents are 
strict Catholics, and yet, she is considering an abortion.   
 
The probability of me trying to talk her out of the abortion is  
_______ 0%  
_______ 10%  
_______ 20%  
_______ 30%  
_______ 40%  
_______ 50%  
_______ 60%  
_______ 70% 
_______ 80%  
_______ 90% 
_______ 100% 
 
 
What decision do you think that the majority of people like yourself would make?  
_______ % 
 
 
********************************************************************* 
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INFIDELITY 
 
Two good friends of yours are getting married in a few weeks. They are a young 
couple and have been dating for three years.  One evening, while you are out dining, 
you notice the male across the room.  He is displaying very affectionate, unmistakable 
intimate behavior with another female.  What would you do?   
 
a) The probability of me confronting the male is  
_______ 0%  
_______ 10%  
_______ 20%  
_______ 30%  
_______ 40%  
_______ 50%  
_______ 60%  
_______ 70% 
_______ 80%  
_______ 90% 
_______ 100% 
 
 
b) The probability of me telling my female friend is  
_______ 0%  
_______ 10%  
_______ 20%  
_______ 30%  
_______ 40%  
_______ 50%  
_______ 60%  
_______ 70% 
_______ 80%  
_______ 90% 
_______ 100% 
 
 
What decision do you think that the majority of people like yourself would make  
For  (a)? _______ % 
For  (b)? _______ % 
 
 
********************************************************************* 
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THE DISEASE PROBLEM 
 
Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, 
which is expected to kill 600 people. Four alternative programs to combat the disease 
have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of 
the programs are as follows:  
 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved but the rest will die. If Program B is 
adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds 
probability that no people will be saved. If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a 
two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.  
 
Please tick the probability that you would consider it acceptable to choose Program A 
_______ 0%  
_______ 10%  
_______ 20%  
_______ 30%  
_______ 40%  
_______ 50%  
_______ 60%  
_______ 70% 
_______ 80%  
_______ 90% 
_______ 100% 
 
 
Please tick the probability that you would consider it acceptable to choose Program B 
_______ 0%  
_______ 10%  
_______ 20%  
_______ 30%  
_______ 40%  
_______ 50%  
_______ 60%  
_______ 70% 
_______ 80%  
_______ 90% 
_______ 100% 
 
 
Please tick the probability that you would consider it acceptable to choose Program C 
_______ 0%  
_______ 10%  
_______ 20%  
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_______ 30%  
_______ 40%  
_______ 50%  
_______ 60%  
_______ 70% 
_______ 80%  
_______ 90% 
_______ 100% 
 
 
Please tick the probability that you would consider it acceptable to choose Program D 
_______ 0%  
_______ 10%  
_______ 20%  
_______ 30%  
_______ 40%  
_______ 50%  
_______ 60%  
_______ 70% 
_______ 80%  
_______ 90% 
_______ 100% 
 
 
What decision do you think that the majority of people like yourself would make?  
For Program A _______ % 
For Program B _______ % 
For Program C _______ % 
For Program D _______ % 
 
********************************************************************* 
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GAME OF CHANCE 
Imagine that you face the following pairs of concurrent decisions. 
 
Decision 1: Choose between the following: 
A) A sure gain of $240 
B) 25% chance to gain $1000 and 75% chance to gain nothing 
 
Decision 2: Choose between the following: 
C) A sure loss of $750 
D) 75% chance to lose $1000 and 25% chance to lose nothing 
 
Please tick the probability that you would chose option A over option B 
_______ 0%  
_______ 10%  
_______ 20%  
_______ 30%  
_______ 40%  
_______ 50%  
_______ 60%  
_______ 70% 
_______ 80%  
_______ 90% 
_______ 100% 
 
Please tick the probability that you would chose option C over option D 
_______ 0%  
_______ 10%  
_______ 20%  
_______ 30%  
_______ 40%  
_______ 50%  
_______ 60%  
_______ 70% 
_______ 80%  
_______ 90% 
_______ 100% 
 
 
What decision do you think that the majority of people like yourself would make?  
For Decision 1 _______ % 
For Decision 2 _______ % 
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APPENDIX 2 
MANIPULATION FOR DEINDIVIDUATED GROUPS 
 
 
Instructions before group discussion 
 
This is a note regarding your computer-mediated communication. You have been 
assigned to a group for your discussion.  The whole group has the same major.  
 
These are YOUR GROUP’S instructions.    
 
One of the advantages of working in groups is that the group forges a distinctive 
identity for itself that can lead to higher quality outcomes. As you work on your group 
project, try to assess the group’s characteristics.  What are the things that identify your 
group and make it different from other groups? Please list those characteristics below. 
 
You are to begin working on the first scenario right away.  
 
 
 
Group’s characteristics: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other comments: 
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APPENDIX 3 
MANIPULATION FOR INDIVIDUATED GROUPS 
 
Instructions before discussion 
 
This is a note regarding your computer-mediated communication.  You will be 
working with several different students. Each student has a different major. 
 
These are YOUR INDIVIDUAL instructions.  
 
One of the advantages of working with others is that the diversity of unique 
individuals can lead to higher quality outcomes. As you work on the scenarios with the 
others, try to assess the characteristics of each person. What are the things that identify 
them as individuals and make them different from one another? Please list those 
characteristics below. 
 
You are to begin working on the first scenario right away, and you might like to start 
by firstly saying a little about yourself (e.g.: hobby/favorite TV show/movie/music 
etc) without disclosing identifying information. 
 
 
Individual ___’s characteristics: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual ___’s characteristics: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other comments: 
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APPENDIX 4 
MEASURES 
 
 
First we want to ask you some questions about your relation to the group taking part in 
the discussion (which we will refer to as 'this group').  For each statement, please 
circle a number from 1 to 7 to indicate how well the statement applies to your thoughts 
and feelings at the moment.  That is, the 'Not at all' and 'Very Much' labels refers to 
the degree of fit between a statement, and your current feelings and thoughts.  Please 
read each question carefully. 
 
Group identity measures (adapted from Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990)   
1. To what extent do the students in this group differ from each other? 
2. To what extent is this group unique, unlike other groups? 
3.  How similar to each other are the students in this group? 
4. I see myself as a member of this group. 
5. I regard this group as important. 
 
Shared identity measure (adapted from Tyler, T. R., 1999)  
6.  I felt loyal toward the group. 
7. I was pleased to be a member of the group. 
8. I felt I was on my own during the project.                         
   
 
Identity measure (adapted from Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990) 
9. I feel uneasy with the other students in this group              
  
10. I feel a bond with other students in this group                    
    
11. I consider the opinions of the other students in this group to be important   
12. I feel I can rely on the other students in this group for support            
 
Task attraction measure (adapted from McCrosky & McCain, 1974) 
13. If I was taking part in another project, I would like to do it with the students in this 
group 
 
Group cohesion measure (adapted from Seashore, 1954) 
14. To what degree did you feel that you are really a part of your group? 
15. If you had a chance to do the same task in another group, how would you feel 
about moving? 
16. How does your group compare with other groups on the way people get along 
together? 
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17. How does your group compare with other groups on the way people stick 
together? 
18. How does your group compare with other groups on the way people help each 
other on the task? 
 
We would like to ask you some questions about your feelings on the group discussion.  
For each statement, please circle a number from 1 to 7 to indicate your satisfaction 
level. “1” indicates very dissatisfied, “7” indicates very satisfied. 
 
How satisfied ARE you with:                          
                   
Group satisfaction measure (adapted from Gouran, 1973) 
19. The solution that the group reached?                              
20. The process by which your group evaluated ideas?          
21. The group’s overall performance?                                
22. Your own contribution in this group discussion?                   
23. Your own contribution to the group’s decision?                     
24. Being a member of this group?                                               
25. Other members’ evaluation of ideas and solutions?                 
26. The solution reached being the best possible one?  
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